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Should Practicing Lawyers Be Legislators?
by
GEORGE F. CARPINELLO*

Legislators, like all public officials, act as fiduciaries' of the public
interest. 2 They are expected to exercise their political power in furtherance of the interests of their constituents and of the body politic as a
whole. 3 Legislators may be characterized either as "delegates," who are
guided strictly by their constituents' desires, or as "trustees" who are
expected to act in their constituents' best interest. 4 Underlying both
models is the assumption that the legislator will act in good faith to fur* Professor of Law, Albany Law School; A.B. 1972, Princeton University; J.D. 1975,
Yale Law School.
1. "[T]he Legislature being only a Fiduciary Power to act for certain ends, there remains still in the People a Supream [sic]Power to remove or alter the Legislature, when they
find the Legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them." J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT, SECOND TREATISE Ch. XIII, § 149, at 385 (P. Laslett 2d ed. 1970) (3d ed.
1698) (emphasis in original).
A fiduciary is "a person holding the character of a trustee, or a character analogous to
that of a trustee, in respect to the trust and confidence involved in it and the scrupulous good
faith and candor which it requires. A person having duty, created by his undertaking, to act
primarily for another's benefit in matters connected with such undertaking." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 563 (5th ed. 1979).

2.

Political scientists debate the question of whether the "public interest" can be defined.

J. FLEISHMAN & B. PAYNE, ETHICAL DILEMMAS AND THE EDUCATION OF POLICYMAKERS

19-20 (1980); Schubert, Is There a PublicInterest Theory?, in THE PUBLIC INTEREST: NOMOS
V 162-76 (C. Friedrich ed. 1962). For our purposes, however, we can define "public interest"
as the legislator's good faith belief as to what is in the constituents' best interests or in the best
interests of the entire community that the representative serves. Fleishman defines it as "what
the official sincerely believes to be to the long-run benefit of the public as a whole" or "the
greatest good for the greatest deserving number, over the longest possible range of time ......
Fleishman, Self Interest and PoliticalIntegrity, in PUBLIC DUTIES: THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 63 (1981) [hereinafter Fleishman, Self Interest].

Fleishman further notes that although scholars claim that the public interest cannot be
defined, an impartial spectator can generally articulate, in any given problem, what is in the
public interest. Id. at 85-86. The question of whether a representative should choose the welfare of her constituents over that of the entire body politic need not be resolved for purposes of
this discussion.
3.

THE HASTINGS CENTER, THE ETHICS OF LEGISLATIVE LIFE, xiii (1985).

4. The former "delegate" model was espoused by James Mill, father of John Stuart Mill.
J. MILL, Essay on Government (1820), in ESSAYS IN GOVERNMENT, JURISPRUDENCE, LIBERTY OF THE PRESS AND LAW OF NATIONS 3-32 (1967). The "trustee" model was adopted by

Edmund Burke in his famous Speech to the Electors of Bristol in 1774, reproduced in ED-
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ther the desires or best interests, respectively, of her constituents and
place those desires or interests before personal interest or the interests of
those with whom the legislator has private business or personal
relationships.
Viewed either as a delegate or a trustee, the legislator's relationship
with the public is analogous to an attorney's relationship with a client.
Because of a disparity in sophistication and expertise, the client cannot
monitor easily his attorney's fidelity to her fiduciary duties. The client
must trust the attorney to act in his best interest. 5 This places a heavy
burden of self-discipline on the attorney to avoid relationships or interests that conflict with the client's interests.
Legislators bear a similar burden. The public often is incapable of
determining whether a legislator's exercise of his independent judgment
in favor of the public interest has been compromised by other interests.
The complexity of many public issues, the abstruseness of the legislative
process, and the public's general lack of awareness of a legislator's position on most issues 6 makes monitoring impractical. If the public loses
MUND BURKE: ON GOVERNMENT, POLITICS AND SOCIETY, 156-58 (B. Hill ed. 1975). See
also French, Burking a Mill, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN GOVERNMENT 7-22 (N. Bowie ed. 1981).
The conflict between the Mill and Burke models can also be described as "the tension
between the normative expectation that a representative should represent the subjective preferences (or self-defined interests) of the constituents and the normative expectation that a representative should represent the objective needs (or enlightened interests) of the constituents."
Jennings, Legislative Ethics and Moral Minimalism, in REPRESENTATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 149, 160 (1985). Jennings adds that, because of voter apathy and the "significant electoral
advantage for incumbents," representative democracy pulls in the direction of the latter model.
Id. Fleishman describes the two roles as "advocate," when the legislator furthers his clients'
interests, and "judge," when the legislator must scrutinize his constituents' preferences and
determine that they are in the constituents' and the whole society's best interest. Fleishman,
Self Interest, supra note 2, at 66.
Modern political scientists have added a third category, the "Politico," who adopts aspects of both the trustee and delegate roles, depending upon the issue. See Eulau, Wahlke,
Buchanan & Ferguson, The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the
Theory of Edmund Burke, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 742 (1959). These authors found from a
four-state survey that 63% of legislators viewed themselves as trustees, 23% as politicos and
14% as delegates. The authors attribute this result, in part, to the complexity of modern
political issues and the willingness of the electorate to entrust these issues to their representatives. Id. at 751; M. JEWELL, REPRESENTATION IN STATE LEGISLATURES 104-13 (1982). See
also THE REPRESENTATIVE: TRUSTEE? DELEGATE? PARTISAN? POLITICO? 108 (N. Riemer
ed. 1967) (adding a fourth type of representative: the partisan, who is a thoughtful adherent to
the positions of her political party).
5. The requirement that an attorney scrupulously avoid any conflict between his own
interests and those of a client, or conflict among clients, has long been part of the profession's
canons of ethics. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1980); CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 6 (1908).
6. M. JEWELL, supra note 4, at 104-13. In his interviews with hundreds of legislators in
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trust in its representatives and comes to believe that its elected representatives are acting only or primarily in their own self-interest, 7 the consequences for democracy are quite serious. Eventually, the citizenry will
be unwilling to make the sacrifices necessary for the long term general
good. 8 The public may be willing, for example, to shoulder the tax burden necessary to bail out the savings and loan industry if it is convinced
that such action is necessary for the health of the economy. Public support for such expenditure would evaporate, however, if the public believed that key members of Congress supported the bill because it would
protect the value of their stock in threatened savings and loan institutes.
The action may still be necessary to protect the national interest, but it
has lost its legitimacy because of the selfish motivations which led to its
passage.
Ironically, the legal profession, which has enjoyed the opportunity
to serve in public office more than any other group, 9 has been insensitive
several states, Jewell found that most legislators believe that their constituents are informed
only on a very small percentage of the issues, and that the constituents "trust them to use their
own judgment on most issues." Id. at 108. One legislator, whose view seemed to be typical
stated that "[p]eople seem to be saying - we elected you; we have confidence in you and
expect you to use your own judgment." Said another: "I think the people elected me to look
at things myself and they trust me to make a decision. They want me to make objective
decisions on issues." id.
7. Public respect for state legislators, never particularly high, has declined further in the
past twenty years. In a survey conducted in the late 1960s, 16% of the respondents rated the
ethics of state legislators as "high" or "very high." By 1977, the percentage had declined to
11%. A 1982 Gallup survey placed the level at 12%; only insurance agents, advertisers, and
used car salesmen ranked lower. Stern, Ethics in the States, in REPRESENTATION AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 4, at 243-44.
8. Fleishman, Self Interest, supra note 2, at 82-83 ("If the motives are suspect, so also is
the advice." On the other hand, "[s]elfless officials can be trusted to exercise judgment without
suspicion that they have been swayed by those who will be benefited by the sacrifices of the rest
of us.").
9. A 1986 survey found that 16% of all state legislators identified their occupation as
attorneys, the largest occupational category nationally. That percentage is down from 22% in
1976. B. BAZAR, STATE LEGISLATORS' OCCUPATIONS: A DECADE OF CHANGE 2-3 (1987).
A previous survey conducted in 1966 found that 26% of all state legislators were attorneys. C.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 751 n.81 (1986). The percentage of attorneys varies
considerably from state to state. In Virginia, for example, 45% of the legislators are attorneys
while none of the members of the Delaware legislature list their occupation as "attorney." B.
BAZAR, supra,at 2. Part of the explanation for the decline in the number of attorneys may lie
in the fact that increasing numbers of legislators consider themselves full-time legislators and
list their occupation as "legislator." Id. at 3. See infra notes 134-50 and accompanying text.
Other factors undoubtedly include the increased time requirements of legislative office, the
impact of disclosure laws on client privacy and the reduced need for public office as a method
of advertising for clients. Id.
Still, attorneys have significant occupational advantages that help explain their continued
preponderance in the legislature. Attorneys can develop flexible work schedules allowing them
to devote substantial time to legislative duties. Attorneys are able to enter the political arena
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to the potential for conflict of interest' ° when an attorney in private practice assumes public office. An attorney retained by a client assumes a
fiduciary duty to protect that client's interests. Those interests may often
conflict with what the lawyer as legislator believes to be the public interest. In being retained by a private client, the attorney only assumes a
fiduciary duty with regard only to the matter he has undertaken. He is
under no duty to conduct his affairs as a citizen or as a legislator to
maximize the welfare of the client.I I Thus, an attorney is not bound by a
fiduciary duty to vote in favor of a client's interest on legislative matters
unrelated to the attorney's representation. It is unrealistic, however, to
expect that lawyer-legislators are not influenced by the concerns of an
important client relating to pending legislation. This influence prevents
the legislator from using his independent judgment in the public interest.
Moreover, the client's needs eventually may include representation
before the legislature. Such representation by the lawyer-legislator, or
his firm, 12 inevitably would create an actual conflict of interest. The legislator would be serving two clients and could not fulfill simultaneously
his fiduciary duty to both his private client and the public.
without significant harm, and often with benefit, to their profession. Of course, attorneys are
also able to use their position in government to the benefit of clients, the issue with which this
article is primarily concerned. Additionally, attorneys uniquely benefit from the political advantages of membership in the legislature since so many other political positions from which
they may come or to which they might advance, such as judge, attorney general, and district
attorney are filled solely by attorneys. Finally, of course, attorneys may have a greater affinity
for legislative work since law, including statutory law, is the stock in trade of the legal profession. F. HARRIS & P. HAIN, AMERICA'S LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES: CONGRESS AND THE
STATES 59-60 (1983); Matthews, Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers, 9 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 547, 550-51 (1984).
10. A conflict of interest for a public official can be defined as "the use of public office to
advance private interests at the expense of some public interest." Cranston, Regulating Conflict of Interest of Public Officials: A ComparativeAnalysis, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 215,
219 (1979).
11. Indeed EC 8-4 of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
when "a lawyer purports to act on behalf of the public, he should espouse only those changes
which he conscientiously believes to be in the public interest." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-4 (1980).
12. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1987); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D) (1987). "It has long been recognized that the
disqualification of one lawyer in an organization generally constituted disqualification of all
affiliated attorneys .... [t]he rule is based upon the close, informal relationship among law
partners and associates and upon the incentives, financial and otherwise, for partners to exchange information freely among themselves when the information relates to existing employment." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 n.2 (1975)
(citations omitted) (The opinion goes on to create an exception to the above-stated rule when
an attorney associated with the firm is disqualified because of prior government service, so long
as the attorney is "screened" from any involvement in the case creating the conflict of interest
and receives no compensation therefrom.).
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This conflict was identified by a former President of the American
Bar Association in 1960 as "one of the most serious [issues] facing the
profession today in the professional responsibility area."' 13 Unfortunately, the organized bar has done little to help attorneys resolve such
conflicts. It has provided conflicting advice and failed to articulate a
workable standard to deal with such conflicts. Even when the conflict
may appear patently obvious to the lay person, the bar, especially the
American Bar Association, has shown a myopia born of short-term selfpreservation. 14
Section I of this Article will examine potential and actual conflicts
of interest faced by lawyer-legislators who represent private clients. The
following section will review attempts by the organized bar and state legislatures to deal with these conflicts. Section III recommends solutions
to these conflicts that balance the need for an independent legislature
with the realities of the citizen legislature composed of individuals for
whom public service is a part-time avocation. Finally, section IV considers the advent of the full-time legislature, and its effect on conflict of
interest issues.
I.

Conflicts of Interest

To some extent a legislator's determination of what is in the public
interest inevitably will be influenced by, or will conflict with, the legislator's own private interest. For example, a legislator who is a farmer or a
doctor may be disposed to vote in favor of provisions that aid farmers or
doctors.' 5 This influence generally is accepted as an inevitable aspect of
democratic government and is not necessarily undesirable. The voters,
by selecting a farmer or a doctor, are aware of the particular point of
view of the legislator and either believe that their views will coincide with
the views of farmers or doctors or that the legislator will not be influenced unduly by that position. In any event, the conflict is unavoidable if
we are to elect representatives from every segment of society. This fact is
13.

Malone, The Lawyer and His ProfessionalResponsibilities, 17 WASH. & LEE L. REV.

191,207 (1960).
14. See infra notes 48-75 and accompanying text.
15. J. Kirby, Jr., Executive Director of the New York City Bar Association states:
Since legislative bodies must be constituted from the general public, it is inevitable
that legislators bring with them the interests of the economic groups to which they
belong .... Such groups are quite large, however, and the legislator's interest is
common to many persons. The potential for adverse effects from such conflicts is
quite low.
Assoc. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 44
(1970) [hereinafter CITY BAR REPORT].
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exempt from conflict of
are shared by a group,
recuse himself from votaffect his farm as well as

When a legislator directly benefits in a unique way from a particular
piece of legislation, however, the legislator generally is expected to announce his or her involvement and to recuse himself from further in16. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 24.60.030(d) (1988) ("A conflict exists if benefits accrue to
a person to whom this chapter applies beyond that which may accrue uniformly to members of
the profession, occupation or group to which the person belongs, or to the public at large.");
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8921 (West Supp. 1989) (no conflict where benefit accrues to legislator to
a degree no greater than any other member of "that business, profession, occupation or
group"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-85 (West 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.765(d)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.1143(c) (West 1965) (no conflict
where economic interest is shared by "general class or general group of persons"); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1014(l)(F) (1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.07 (West 1988) (no conflict
when effect no greater than on other member of the official's business classification, profession
or occupation); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-2-112(3) (1987); N.J. REV. STAT. § 52:13D-18(b)
(1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 4246 (West 1987) (legislator shall not promote "special
interest" legislation that affects legislator or in which legislator has substantial financial interest, but legislator may promote "general legislation" that directly affects legislator or in which
legislator has substantial financial interest); OR. REV. STAT. § 244.020(4)(b) (1983); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 36-14-7(b) (1984); N.D. H.R. RULES & SEN. RULES 318, 319 (member must vote on
all questions, unless member has "personal or private interest," which means an interest "that
affects the member directly, individually, uniquely and substantially"); UTAH JOINT LEG.
RULE 16.03(7); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-639.31 (1987); WASH. CODE OF LEG. ETHICS, Rule I
(1987); Md. Comm. on Ethics, Informal Op. 78-33 (1978) (lawyer-legislator may vote on matters which generally affect the profession; should disqualify himself only on matter in which he
has a "direct personal or pecuniary interest.").
See also MODEL STATE CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE LAW

§ 17 (1979) (legislator shall disclose when discharge of duties may financially affect the legislator, a member of his household or a business with which he is associated, "which is distinguishable from the effects of such action on the public generally or a broad segment of the
public").
17. James Mill, in fact, argued that it is essential for legislators to be affected directly by
their actions in the same way that constituents are to ensure that the legislators act in their
constituents' best interests. J. MILL, supra note 4, at 18. Thus, it would be undesirable for
legislators not to have some personal interest in the legislation before them. See also THE
HASTINGS CENTER, supra note 3, at 35 ("When legislators cannot separate the promotion of
their constituents' interests from the promotion of their own, that is a sign that democratic
politics is functioning as it should. Conflicts of interest arise-as the term implies-when a
legislator's personal or political self-interests pull in one direction and his or her duty to serve
broader public interests pulls in another."); THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison) (Madison's
comments in Federalist No. 10 when he distinguished between the judge who must not judge
his own case, and the legislator, who, acting for the entire public, inevitably acts in his own
personal self interest as he perceives it); J. NOONAN, BRIBES 434 (1984); Gutman & Thompson, The Theory of Legislative Ethics, in REPRESENTATION AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note
4, at 175.
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volvement with the legislation. 18 This conflict is similar to the conflict of
interest that generally is condemned in the legal profession's rules of professional conduct. When an attorney has an interest that is or may be
directly contrary to that of her client, to avoid acting contrary to her
client's interest, the attorney is expected to inform the client and to remove herself from the situation. 19
While some conflicts between private interest and public duty are
inevitable, prudential rules have been adopted to reduce the frequency of
such conflict. These include laws that prohibit or severely restrict legislators, as well as other government officials, from contracting with the
state, 20 from accepting employment that readily could lead to conflicts, 21
or from accepting employment upon departure from governmental service from entities regulated by the agency that formerly employed the
22
official.
18. See infra note 92.
19. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1970).
20. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. III, § 18; ALA. CODE § 36-25-11 (1977); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 29, §§ 5804(d), 58056) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.313(3)(7) (West 1982); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 84-15 (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 46-233(b) (1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 42.1113 (West 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1014(3)(A) (1989); MASS. GEN. L. ch.
268A, § 7 (1970); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.302 (1981); Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-4-105(2)(a),
(b), (t) (1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.456 (Vernon 1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-14,102
(1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281.481(4) (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 95.1
(1978); N.J. REV. STAT. § 52:13D-19 (1986); N.J. LEG. CODE OF ETHICS § 2:5 (1983); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 10-16-7, 9 (1987); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73(4) (McKinney 1988); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-13-03 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 102.04(B) (Anderson 1984); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 74, § 4246(e) (1987); 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 403(c) (Purdon Supp. 1989); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 36-14-5(h) (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-410(2) (Law. Co-op. 1986); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-639.6, 2.1-639.35 (1987); UTAH JOINT LEG. RULES 16.03(a) (1987) (legislators may contract after public notice and competitive bidding); Wash. Code of Leg. Ethics
(c)(2); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19:45(6) (West 1987).
21. See infra note 91.
22. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-504(A) (1985) (one year term relating only to
matters with which public official was directly concerned and participated in while at agency);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5805(f) (1983) (two year ban relating only to matters participated
in by public official); HAW. REV. STAT. § 84-18 (1985) (one year ban on legislators and employees, relating to matters participated in, as well as all other official action by the relevant
agency); IOWA CODE ANN. § 68 B.7 (West 1973) (two year ban on matters participated in by
public official; two year ban on any appearance before agency by supervisory personnel, if paid
on a contingency basis); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.1121 (West 1989) (two year ban on senior
officials, including legislators, appearing before former agencies; two year ban on all employees
as to matters participated in while at agency; two year ban on former employees contracting to
perform services for agency); MD. ANN. CODE art. 40A, § 3-103(b) (1988) (permanent ban on
representing parties in cases which involve the state in which the person was involved while a
state official); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 5 (West Supp. 1989) (permanent ban on
matters involved with; one year ban as to matters formerly under official's responsibility in
which state is a party; bans apply to partners of employees as well); MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-4-
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Legislators who are also practicing attorneys face a special problem
not shared by other legislators. When an attorney enters the legislature,
he brings with him not only his own private interest, which may conflict
with the public good, but also the interests of each and every client.
Thus, the attorney, unlike the farmer or the doctor, inevitably has a
wider range of potential conflicts. Virtually all legislation will affect,
often directly and significantly, the interests of clients. 23 An attorney
may be disposed to act sympathetically toward his clients' interests.
Thus, for the attorney, the conflict is more acute, because he may be
forced to sacrifice a particular client's best interests for the benefit of his
more general client-the public. 2 4 Moreover, a particular client's interests may well require zealous representation at the legislative or administrative level. If the lawyer-legislator undertakes such representation, he
25
inevitably sacrifices his fiduciary duty to his constituents.
105(e) (1988) (permanent ban on matters involved with); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281.491(1)
(Michie 1986) (permanent ban on matters which were considered by the agency during the
former official's tenure); N.J. REV. STAT. § 52:13D-17 (1986) (permanent ban for official and
members of firm, with regard to matters involved with); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73(8) (McKinney Supp. 1989) (two year absolute ban for all former employees of effective branch; permanent ban on matters involved with); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 102.03(A) (Anderson Supp.
1984) (one year ban with regard to matters involved with; two year absolute ban on certain
officials of public service commission); 65 PA. CONS. SrAT. ANN. § 403(e) (Purdon Supp.
1989) (one year absolute ban as to all appearances, with or without compensation); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 36-14-5(4) (1988) (general ban on appearing before official's former agency for one
year); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-500(2) (Law. Co-op. 1986) (permanent ban as to matters in-

volved with as an official);

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 42.22.040 (1972) (two year ban on

appearing before former agency on matters involved with while at agency); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 19:45(8) (West 1986) (one-year ban on former state officials, other than legislators and legislative employees, appearing before former agency; one year ban on appearing in judicial or
quasi-judicial proceeding as to matters under their responsibility as state official; permanent
ban on appearing in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings on matters involved with "personally
and substantively").
23. As the Delaware State Bar Committee on Professional Responsibility said, "Few
pieces of legislation do not affect the interests of some client of a busy lawyer." Law. Man. on
Prof. Conduct, Ethics Ops. 1980-83 (ABA/BNA). Del. Op. 1982-5 (1982). The Committee
relied on this fact, however, to conclude that there could be no blanket prohibition on a lawyer-legislator using his position to support legislation favorable to a client. See infra notes 71,
74-75 and accompanying text.
24. See Malone, supra note 13, at 207:
[T]he standard I have suggested for lawyers is higher than that required of other
legislators. True, the merchant in the legislature does not abstain from voting on a
proposed increase in the sales tax; the wholesaler does not abstain on fair trade legislation; nor does the doctor abstain when legislation governing naturopaths is under
consideration. The difference, of course, is that the lawyer is not protecting his personal interest, but rather the interest of one who, so far as the public is concerned,
has purchased his protection.
25.

See infra notes 51-57, 67-69 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, a legislator's constituents are not likely to know the
client's interests. While the public can decide that they want a doctor or
farmer as a representative, they are not able to make a decision as to
whether they want a lawyer who, in private practice may represent
banks, insurance companies, labor unions, or other clients unknown to
the public, whose interests are affected significantly by legislative action.
The problem is compounded when potential clients recognize and
seek to use the attorney's dual role. Some clients believe that the attorney can provide not only the services that any other attorney can provide, but also the potential additional service of influence within the
government. Thus, by representing that he can represent the client's interest while also representing the public good, the attorney is an attractive target for undue influence.
At its extreme, the dual role of lawyer-legislator may facilitate simple bribery.2 6 It is recognized universally as improper and illegal for a
legislator to accept a payment of money as a quidpro quo for a particular
vote.2 7 The bribe compromises the legislator's autonomy. The vote is
not based on the best interests of the legislator's constituents, but upon
26. Bribery generally is defined as the giving or receiving of "anything of value" "corruptly" with intent "to influence" the performance of an official act. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)
(1979). Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.1 (1980), which does not contain the term "corruptly," but which limits bribery of a public servant, party official or voter to the conferring of
a "pecuniary benefit." See generallyid. (discussing deletion of "corrupt" purpose requirement
due to difficulty in defining scope of term).
Bribery is the only crime, other than treason, that is specifically mentioned in the Constitution, and both are referred to only with regard to impeachment of the President. U.S.
Const., art. II, § 4. The Framers failed to specify any grounds for the removal of legislators,
except to state that it could be accomplished only by a two-thirds vote. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
They apparently believed that it would be much more difficult to corrupt the many members of
Congress than one President. See J. NOONAN, supra note 17, at 429-34. They did not take
into account either the willingness of special interests to pay large numbers of legislators (see,
e.g., id. at 435-42 (the Yazoo land scheme)) or their ability to identify those key members of
the legislature who, by controlling the right committee or coalition of votes, could shepherd
desired legislation through the Congress.
Noonan suggests another reason accounting for the lack of a constitutional sanction
against corruption by legislators: the belief that the political sanction would effectively deal
with the corrupted legislators. Id. at 435, 442. But as the Yazoo affair demonstrated, the
retribution of the voters has proven to be a flimsy sword. Id. at 435-42. See infra notes 108-12
and accompanying text.
The Framers were sensitive, however, to the possibility of bribery of legislators by the
executive. They believed that influence peddling by the Crown and the offer of lucrative offices
in the government had totally corrupted the British Parliament. To deal with the problem of
enticement with offers of position by the Executive, the Framers prohibited legislators from
assuming any other office during their term if the office was created or the salary was increased, during their term. Id.; U.S. CONST., art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
27. See United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For two comprehensive discussions of the ambiguity of bribery statutes see Lowenstein, PoliticalBribery and the
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the financial reward. 28 When a lawyer-legislator accepts a "retainer"
from a client with the tacit understanding that the payment is for the
attorney's services in the legislature, the legislator is guilty of accepting a
29
bribe.
The conflict problem is not limited to the egregious case of the camouflaged bribe. Even if both the attorney and the client enter into a bona
fide relationship for that attorney's private services, the problem of conflicting interests nonetheless remains. It is unrealistic to expect that an
attorney receiving a significant amount of his outside income from a particular client will knowingly vote contrary to that client's interests in the
legislature. 30 Intentionally or not, the attorney's perception of the public
good is shaped by the client's perspective.
The conflict can arise with any client, but most clearly arises in the
case of institutional clients. Clients such as banks, insurance companies,
utilities, labor unions, and regulated industries are not only heavy users
of attorney services, but also are most likely to be interested in specific
legislation. A conflict is not only possible but, indeed, inherently likely. 3I
32
The problem is not theoretical. It plagued Congress for years.
The hiring of prominent legislators' law firms by companies directly afIntermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784 (1985) and Note, Campaign Contributions and FederalBribery Law, 92 HARV. L. REV. 451 (1978).
28. Gutman & Thompson, supra note 17, at 175-76.
29. Describing corruption in the early 19th century, Noonan notes that the fact that
"money paid to lawyers could be explained, or rationalized, or laundered as money paid for
actual legal services was a substantial difficulty in isolating bribes paid to lawyers occupying
official posts." J. NOONAN, supra note 17, at 447.
30. "[I]t is totally unrealistic to expect lawyers to subordinate their clients' interests when
they make decisions as trustees of the public interest." CITY BAR REPORT, supra note 15, at
105.
31. See, for example, D. PEARSON & J. ANDERSON, THE CASE AGAINST CONGRESS 101207 (1968), in which the hiring of the law firms of U.S. Senators and Representatives by major
corporations was discussed at length: "Of the 50 law firms in the survey, 40 represent banks,
31 represent insurance companies, II represent gas and oil companies, 10 represent real-estate
firms." Id. at 102.
32. The hiring of members of Congress by private interests for representation before federal courts and agencies was common in the mid-19th century. In 1853, as a result of the
questionable practice by members of Congress and office holders of prosecuting claims on
behalf of private individuals against the federal government, Congress passed the first general
statute prohibiting payment to public officers for bringing claims against the federal government. B. MANNING, FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAW 75-77, 277 (1964) (discussing
Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 81 52, 10 Stat. 170). This was followed by legislation during the Civil
War, apparently as a result of continued abuses, that prohibited political officers from receiving compensation for any representation before federal agencies in any matter in which the
United States was interested. Id. at 14-16, 276 (discussing Act of June 11, 1864, ch. 119, 13
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fected by legislative action assumed scandalous proportions. 33 In the
minds of many, including some members of Congress, the retainer was
Stat. 123). J. NOONAN, supra note 17, at 452-53. These provisions are now codified as 18
U.S.C. §§ 203, 205 (1969 & Supp. 1989).
A more significant and longer lasting problem was the payment of retainers to members of
Congress for the purpose of representing private interests in Congress. The most famous example was David Webster's unabashed mention to Nicholas Biddle, President of the Bank of
the United States, that his retainer should be renewed so that his "relation to the bank be
continued." Webster, like many members, also represented special interests, such as the Bank,
before the courts while sitting in the Senate. While some challenged Webster's "retainer" from
the Bank, few saw anything improper in Webster's overt representation of the Bank before the
courts. The fact that the Congress was called to vote on the rechartering of the Bank did not
appear to create a conflict of interest in the minds of contemporaries. Baker, The History of
CongressionalEthics, in REPRESENTATION AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 4, at 3-27. Webster's role as attorney for the Bank while sitting in the Senate was also not that unusual.
Henry Clay also was retained by the Bank and Thomas Hart Benton, senator from Missouri,
was retained by John Jacob Astor's American Fur Company, which had a long and abiding
interest in Congressional action. J. NOONAN, supra note 17, at 444-45. Webster also was
beholden to the Bank as one of a number of federal officeholders, including Henry Clay and
James Monroe, who had borrowed significant sums of money from the Bank. Id. at 444.
In contrast, John Quincy Adams, in turning down an offer to argue a case in the Supreme
Court while serving as a member of Congress, commented:
It occurs to me that this double capacity of a counsellor in courts of law and a
member of a legislative body affords opportunity and temptation for contingent fees
of a very questionable moral purity. It is a sad contemplation of human nature to
observe how the action of members of legislative bodies may be bought and sold, and
how some of the brightest stars in that firmament may pass in occultation without
losing their lustre.
Baker, supra, at 9. Senate and House rules enacted in 1968, and strengthened in 1977, have
effectively put an end to the outside practice of law by members of Congress. See infra notes
43-44 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 419 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1969) (former Congressman
convicted for accepting attorney's "fees" for influencing federal administrative action); CITY
BAR REPORT, supra note 15, at 79-85 (tracing the history of congressional law practices from
Daniel Webster through the 1960s); P. DOUGLAS, ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT 53 (1952)
(Officials (and legislators) who are also lawyers can reap a profitable harvest without
too much opprobrium. Firms can always engage them on other matters or pay them
a "retainer" for general "services," and it can always be claimed that it is the lawyer
and not the official who is being hired. The legal profession has been slow to recognize the fact that since the two are the same man, the income received by the lawyer
may help to sway the acts of the official.);
J. GOULDEN, THE SUPERLAWYERS 268-86 (1971) (describing the successes of a number of
congressmen and senators who made use of their Washington ties as lobbyists and attorneys
both during and after their legislative careers); D. PEARSON & J. ANDERSON, supra note 31, at
102
([s]ome of the biggest corporate names in America are listed as clients of Congressmen's law firms in such out of the way places, say, as Nicholasville, Kentucky and
Pascagoula, Mississippi... [t]here is no doubt that the vested interests have sought
out and systematically engaged the services of Congressmen who are lawyers.
The authors go on to detail numerous instances of congressmen and senators being "retained"
by corporations or individuals who have an interest in legislation pending in Congress); Conflict of Interest? Putting A Lid on Lawyers in Congress, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT,
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perhaps the most effective method of influence peddling. 34 Although
Congress has effectively eliminated the problem, 35 it still plagues state
36
legislatures throughout the country.
As early as 1944, the State Bar of Michigan noted that it was "common knowledge that some lawyer-legislators are tendered retainers or are
continued in employment by clients because such lawyer-legislator has a
vote in the legislative [sic] and is presumed to have some influence with
his colleagues." ' 37 In 1957, the Texas Bar Association acknowledged that
"[i]t is common knowledge that many lawyer-legislators are on legal retainer fees which are naturally calculated to improperly influence legislation of the subject matter embraced by such retainers ....
"38
The
problem continues thirty years later. Recently, it was revealed that a
major New York bank, interested in important legislation pending before
the New York State Legislature, had retained the law firms of both the
Democratic Speaker of the Assembly and of an important aide to the
Republican Majority Leader of the State Senate. The bank claimed that
Sept. 12, 1977, at 39 (discussing the law practices of a number of members of Congress in light
of legislation capping the amount a congressional member may earn for personal services).
34. A study conducted by the Brookings Institution in the early 1970s found widespread
feeling among members of the House of Representatives, especially nonlawyers, that an
outside law practice created considerable conflict. According to one member, outside practice
was an "obvious channel for sanitized bribery and influence peddling. Every major bribery
effort of a public official goes through a law firm." E. BEARD & S. HORN, CONGRESSIONAL
ETHICS: THE VIEW FROM THE HOUSE 23 (1975).
35. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
36. For example, Alan G. Havesi, a New York state legislator and perceptive critic of the
legislative system states: "Why should a legislator who, for example, is an attorney get involved in a direct and naked payoff when he can simply and legally accept a retainer from the
interested lobby group for his law firm?" A. HAVESI, LEGISLATIVE POLITICS IN NEW YORK
STATE 189 (1975). See also the comments of a former Connecticut State Senator: "Legal
payoffs through public relations fees, or legal counsel fees are often reported to be involved in
moving legislation forward in some states." Lockard, The State Legislator,in STATE LEGISLATURES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 115 (1966). For an illustration of how the problem has cast a
shadow over the California state legislature, see Capitol conflicts of interest-whereto draw the
line? Sacramento Union, Dec. 23, 1980, at D-1, and Conflict of Interest still a Major Legislative Problem, San Mateo Times, Aug. 21, 1980, reprintedin STAFF OF CAL. FAIR POLITICAL
PRACTICES COMM., LEGISLATORS AS ADVOCATES BEFORE STATE AGENCIES:

AVOIDING

app. (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter CAL. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST REPORT]; for a descriptive analysis of the problem in Virginia, see Frankel & Bauer, It's
Assembly Time Again in Richmond, Annapolis; Va. Lawyer-Legislators Use Powerfor Clients,
Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1981, at A-1, col. 1; The Case of Virginia Sell. Babalas, Wash. Post, Jan.
9, 1986, at A-22; Baker, Va. Senate Votes to Censure Babalasfor Ethics Violation, Wash. Post,
Jan. 24, 1987, at A-1, col. 4 (Virginia senator censured for voting on issue affecting client after
receiving $60,000 in legal fees from client; senator was acquitted of one criminal charge and
second was dismissed).
37. Mich. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 83 (1944).
38. Tex. State Ethics Advisory Comm'n, Op. 162 (1957).
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
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these two firms, out of the thousands of firms practicing law in New
York, happened to be best qualified to perform real estate closings. 39 The
examples do not end with the leadership. In New York, where 32 out of
61 senators and 45 out of 150 assemblymembers are lawyers, there are
numerous instances of representatives or their senior staff unabashedly
pursuing their clients' interests through legislation. 4° The problem is not
41
unique to New York. It is endemic in the state legislative system.
II.

Responses to the Problem

Despite widespread publicity regarding the use of public office to
favor legislators' private clients, little has been done on the state level to
deal with the problem. The problem, however, has been addressed on
the federal level. After much criticism and a bar recommendation that
all outside practice be prohibited, 42 Congress made it virtually impossible
for representatives and senators to engage in outside practice. Specifically, the House of Representatives limits income from outside employment to 30 percent of a representative's government salary. 43 The Senate
expressly prohibits any senator from practicing law except as a sole practitioner on nonofficial time. 44 In any event, service in Congress and
campaigning for reelection has become a full-time job. Members of Congress who are lawyers simply cannot afford to spend time in private practice. Moreover, members of Congress no longer "sell" their name and
influence to private law firms. Mere use of a legislator's name to add
lustre and the aura of power to a law firm has long been prohibited by the
45
codes of ethics.
Prohibiting outside practice, however, has not been considered viable on a state level because state legislators traditionally have served only
39. Miller spokesman denies conflict in Citibank business, Times Union (Albany, N.Y.),
Feb. 9, 1988, at B-12, col. 7. The New York Times reported that the new majority leader of
the Senate, Ralph J. Marino, pledged at the time of his selection "that his top aides will not
have outside law practices, as many of Mr. Anderson's did, that could cause a conflict of

interest." Kolbert, L.L Lawmaker Shakes Albany In G.O.P. Rise, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1988,
at B-I, col. 4, B-8, col. 1.
40.

Madden & Smothers, The Lawyers in Albany: Lawmakers with Two Hats, N.Y.

Times, July 15, 1987, at 1, col. 5.
41. See supra note 36.
42. The recommendation was made by the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York in 1970. CiTY BAR REPORT, supra note 15, at I 11.
43. H.R. Doc. No. 277, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., rule XLVII at 704-05 (1985).
44. S. Doc. No. 100-1, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., rule XXXVII at 71 (1984).
45. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-102(B) (1983); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Ops. 1134 (1969), 1205 (1972),
1240 (1972) (legislator's name may be retained in firm letterhead only if the legislator practices
law and renders services to clients of that firm on a "regular and active basis").
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part time. Legislators proclaim pride in their citizen and part-time nature, even if, in reality, state legislators are becoming increasingly full
time. 46 Moreover, political pressure generally has kept state legislative
salaries at relatively low levels. Although salaries have steadily increased, with some states paying in excess of 50,000 dollars, 47 legislative
salaries are still considerably below salaries that can be earned in private
law practice. This citizen-legislature ethos has proved a significant barrier to serious discussion and resolution of the lawyer-legislator conflict
of interest.
A.

The Position of the Organized Bar

The organized bar has not responded adequately to the problem. As
this section shows, although the ABA has considered the problem, it has
not provided strong guidance. Perhaps as a consequence, state bar associations have reacted inconsistently. The first significant discussion of
this issue by the organized bar occurred in 1944. The State Bar of Michigan's Committee on Professional Ethics was asked whether it was proper
for a lawyer-legislator to accept employment from a client who was "directly or indirectly" interested in proposed legislation. The panel first
noted that the strict prohibition against representing conflicting interests
under Canon 6 of the former Canons of Professional Ethics 48 could not
46. The number of state legislators claiming other professions is declining. In 1976, 48%
of all state legislators identified themselves as lawyers, business owners, or insurance or real
estate executives. In 1986, only 37% so identified themselves. In 1986, 11% of the legislators
considered themselves to be full-time legislators. Paterson, Is the Citizen LegislatureBecoming
Extinct, in STATE GOVERNMENT 75-78 (1988). See infra note 136.
47. In New York, legislators' base salaries recently have been raised to $57,500, although
with stipends and expense reimbursements, actual pay can be significantly greater. Cuomo
Urges Study of Plan For Full-time Legislature, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1987, at B-4, col. 4 (national ed.). In the New York Senate, for example, there are 87 positions that pay additional
stipends in a body which has only 61 members. These stipends range from $30,000 for the
Temporary President or majority leader, to $9,000 for the chairman of every committee and
$6,500 for the ranking minority member of every committee. N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 5-a (McKinney Supp. 1989). In the Assembly, similar stipends are given for some 108 positions in the
150-member Assembly. Id. No legislator, however, is eligible to receive more than one stipend at the same time. Id. § 5-a(2).
In California, legislators earn more than $50,000 when salary, per diem expenses, pension,
and other perquisites are added. Stern, Ethics in the States: The Laboratives of Reform, in
REPRESENTATION AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 4, at 246. While New York and California are somewhat exceptional, there are now fifteen states which provide a base pay (without
including per diem expenses) of at least $20,000, and seven that pay more than $30,000: California ($40,816); Illinois ($35,661); Massachusetts ($39,000); Michigan ($39,881); New York
($57,500, as of Jan. 1, 1989); Ohio ($34,905); Pennsylvania ($47,000). As of 1990, New
Jersey's base salary will rise to $35,000. COUNCIL OF STATE GoV'TS, THE BOOK OF THE
STATES 97-99 (1988-89).
48. "Itis unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all
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be avoided by consent of the parties, since one party was the public. No
surrogate, not even a representative's constituents, could give such consent. The panel concluded that a private retainer might unreasonably
influence the legislator and, because "[e]very conflict of interest must be
resolved in favor of the public trust," the panel held that the retainer
should not be accepted. The legislator must "sever completely any existing client relationship where the client is or becomes interested in legis'49
lative action."
This opinion clearly recognized the conflict, but failed to address the
practical implications for the lawyer-legislator. When is a client "interested"? What if the client is affected by annual legislation because of the
business it is in? What if the client is interested in legislation, but its
interest is no greater than that shared by a group or class in society?50
The American Bar Association has provided weak and inconsistent
guidance. In its first major opinion on the subject of lawyer-legislators,
the ABA's Committee on Professional Ethics opined in 1959 that a law
firm could not represent a client before a legislative committee while a
member of the firm is serving in the legislature. 5' Little analysis was
given, but the Committee's reliance on Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, 5 2 and a previous opinion in which an attorney was barred
from representing a criminal defendant while his partner was the prosecuting attorney,5 3 left little doubt that the Committee viewed the dual
representation as a conflict of interest.5 4 Moreover, the Committee emconcerned given after full disclosure of the fact ....

CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

Canon 6 (1908).
49.

Mich. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 83 (1944), reprintedin 38 MICH. S.B.J. 109

(1959).
50. The Committee on Professional Ethics dealt only tangentially with these issues a year
later when it was asked whether a relationship between a client and lawyer-legislator was
improper when the attorney did not know that the client "will or may be interested or affected
by the legislative action." The Committee stated that impropriety depended upon knowledge--either actual or implied-but that if the conflict does become apparent to the legislator
at some subsequent time, the legislator must then sever the relationship. If, however, the relationship proceeds to the point where "he has become disqualified as a legislator," he must then
not only remove himself from the vote, but also officially explain the reasons for his disqualification to his colleagues. The committee concluded that such disqualification should be rare,
since the legislator should be "sufficiently circumspect so as ordinarily to avoid conflicts of
interest." Mich. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 87 (1945), reprinted in 38 MICH. S.B.J.
114 (1959).
51. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 296 (1959).
52. Id. Ironically, Canon 6 was cited in the abstract of the opinion but was not referred
to at all in the opinion.
53. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 16 (1929).
54. In Opinion 306, the Committee characterized Opinion 296 as holding "in effect, that
there was a necessary conflict of interest where a partner or associate of a law firm was in the
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phasized that neither full disclosure before the legislative committee, nor
the fact that the legislator would not share in the fee would change the
result.
The obvious purpose of such a prohibition was to eliminate the
likely possibility that the legislator's firm's advocacy of a private client's
interest would affect her judgment of the public good. Because legislators are expected to make their decisions based upon their determination
of the public good, receipt of funds by them or their partners for the
purpose of influencing legislation is antithetical to that goal. The legislator's fiduciary duty to her private client inevitably conflicts with her fiduciary duty to the public.
Less than three years later, however, the Committee on Professional
Ethics retreated from its previous opinion in the face of considerable criticism from the bar. The Committee concluded, by analogy to private
practice, that the public could "consent" to such a conflict of interest
through either constitutional or statutory provisions that "expressly or
by necessary implication recognize the propriety of a lawyer appearing
'55
before legislative committees, or otherwise lobbying in the legislature."
The Committee found such consent in a Texas constitutional provision
that had the obvious purpose of removing conflicts of interest, not of
consenting to them: "A member who has a personal interest in any measure or bill, proposed or pending before the legislature, shall disclose the
'56
fact to the House of which he is a member, and shall not vote thereon."
The Committee concluded that this provision amounted to public
consent to allow lawyer-legislators' law firms to lobby the legislature as
long as that legislator disclosed the conflict and declined to vote. 57 For
legislature, for another representative of the firm to appear before the legislature and sponsor
or oppose legislation in the interest of one of the clients of the firm." ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 306 (1962).
Interestingly, the Committee went on to say that it had held, in the prior opinion, that
-'since the public was involved, consent to the dual representation could not be given, so as to
meet the requirements of Canon 6 .... " While a committee of the State Bar of Michigan had
so held expressly in 1944, see supra note 49, no mention of either the issue of consent or of
Canon 6 were made in the ABA's prior opinion. See supra note 51.
55. We have been advised that in some states, particularly some of the smaller
states, our ruling has had the effect of cutting down on the number of lawyers in the
legislatures, and has deterred many able young lawyers employed by law firms from
standing for positions in the legislature; and as requested by some members of the
Bar from certain of these states, we have given consideration to Opinion 296.
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 306 (1962) (emphasis in original).
56. Id., (quoting TEX. CONST. art. III, § 22).
57. While such provisions were probably never intended to apply to the situation we
now have under discussion, such provisions are very broad and it seems to the Committee they might appropriately be considered as applicable to a legislator-lawyer
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those states that did not have such constitutional provisions, the Committee offered a convenient escape by suggesting that an act of the legislature or legislative rule "substantially to the effect" of the Texas
constitutional provision would provide the necessary consent.
In 1970, the ABA adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which, unlike the Canons of Professional Ethics, specifically addresses the responsibilities of attorneys as public officials. In its ethical
considerations, the Code is sensitive to the dual role an attorney may
play as advocate for a client and as a public official, or simply as a citizen
seeking political reform. Thus, the Code admonishes attorneys that
when they disclose representation of a client, they may advocate that
client's position, even though they disagree with it. But when "the lawyer purports to act on behalf of the public, he should espouse only those
changes which he conscientiously believes are in the public interest. ' 58
Similarly, a lawyer who is a public official, whether full or part time, is
admonished not to engage in activities "in which his personal and professional interests are or foreseeably may be in conflict with his official
duties." 5 9
The Code's applicable disciplinary rule, however, is inconsistent
with these admonitions. DR 8-101(A)(1) prohibits an attorney from using his public position to obtain "special advantages" for himself or for a
client only "where he knows or it is obvious that such action is not in the
public interest."' 60 The implication is that if, in the lawyer-legislator's
whose firm was employed by a client to lobby for or against certain legislation. As a
member or associate of the law firm he has a 'personal and private interest' in the
activities of the firm in behalf of the client. Accordingly, it is the opinion of the
Committee that in states having a constitutional provision of this kind, the public in
its basic law has consented to appearances by lawyers under such circumstances and
has removed the question of conflict by providing that the legislator in question
should disclose the interest and not vote upon the measure.
Id.
58.

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-4 (1984).

59. Id. EC 8-8 (1987).
60. DR 8-101 reads in full:
(A) A lawyer who holds public office shall not:
(1) Use his public position to obtain, or attempt to obtain, a special advantage
in legislative matters for himself or for a client under circumstances where he knows
or it is obvious that such action is not in the public interest.
(2) Use his public position to influence, or attempt to influence, a tribunal to act
in favor of himself or of a client.
(3) Accept any thing of value from any person when the lawyer knows or it is
obvious that the offer is for the purpose of influencing his action as a public official.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 8-101 (1980). See also id. DR 9-

101(C) (admonishing an attorney not to "state or imply that he is able to influence improperly
or upon irrelevant grounds any tribunal, legislative body or public official").
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opinion, the client's interest is consistent with the public interest, no conflict is created. The problem with such an approach is that the existence
of the private interest itself tends to corrupt the ability of the legislator to
make an independent determination of the public interest. The rule invites self-serving justification on the legislator's part. 6' Even if the legislator consciously avoids the influence of his client's interest, such action
creates the appearance of impropriety and leads to public distrust of the
legislator's true motives. 62 In the eyes of colleagues and constituents, the
legislator is compromised by the client's agenda. The result is a loss of
confidence in both the legal profession and the legislature.
The rule also is inconsistent with virtually all conflict of interest
rules and statutes regulating the conduct of public officials. Almost universally, a public official is prohibited or admonished from undertaking
any official action that might benefit himself, or other private persons,
whether or not such action might be deemed to be in the public interest. 63 The use of public office for private gain is presumed to be against
the public interest.
The weakness of DR 8-101 was amply demonstrated in 1971 when
the ABA's Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility was
asked whether a lawyer-legislator could accept a retainer from a client,
such as a bank, public utility, or labor union, that is likely to be affected
by proposed legislation. 64 The Committee gave no definitive answer.
The Committee concluded that the drafters of the Code did not intend
for DR 8-101(A)(1) to be an absolute ban on the representation of all
private clients who might be interested in legislation. "[S]uch a blanket
proscription would make it a drastic measure, for there would be extremely few clients whom the lawyer-legislator could represent." The
Committee therefore narrowed further the conditions for exclusion by
construing "special advantage" as a "direct and peculiar advantage," and
''not in the public interest" as legislation "clearly inimical to the best
interests of the public as a whole."' 65 Since the answer to the posed question would depend on specific facts, that were not enumerated, the Com61. See CITY BAR REPORT, supra note 15, at 108.
62. "lAin attorney holding public office should avoid all conduct which might lead the
layman to conclude that the attorney is utilizing his public position to further his professional
success or personal interests." ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 192 (1939).
63. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,222, 5 C.F.R. § 735.201a(a) (1989) (requiring federal
employees to avoid any action that might result in "using public office for private gain"). The
prohibition is not qualified by the possibility that such use of office might also be deemed to be
in the public interest. See also statutes cited infra note 92.
64. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1182 (1971).
65. Id.
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mittee chose not to advise the requesting attorney what he should do
when legislation affecting his client is presented in the legislature. The
Committee further noted that the Code does not regulate an attorney's
66
conduct as legislator but leaves this to local law.
The Committee also was asked whether it was appropriate for a lawyer-legislator to appear on behalf of a private client before an administrative agency when the members of the agency - are appointed by the
legislature. While acknowledging the admonition of DR 8-101(A)(2)
that an attorney not use "his public position to influence.. . a tribunal to
act in favor of himself or of a client," the Committee refused to condemn
the practice because whether or not the attorney was influencing or attempting to influence the agency would be a question of fact. 67
This conclusion ignores the inherent impropriety of allowing a legislator to be an advocate before those state employees whom he indirectly
controls. The members of the agency who are required to act in the public good may be influenced in their decision making by the fact that the
advocate before the agency is also a legislator with the power to reward
or punish the agency for its individual decision. 68 This, at the very least,
creates the appearance of impropriety. The public is led to believe that
the decision by the agency may be shaped by the advocate's identity
rather than by the substance of the parties' asserted positions.
Second, appearing before state agencies exacerbates the problem
faced by lawyer-legislators because it makes the lawyer even more attractive to those clients who are interested in obtaining attorneys with influence. The clients who need representation before agencies are generally
the same clients who are particularly interested in matters that are the
subject of legislation. Moreover, the lawyer's role as advocate for clients
66. Id. The Committee failed to explain how this statement was to be reconciled with DR
8-101(A)(3) of the ABA Model Code of Professional- Responsibility, which provides that a
lawyer should not accept anything of value, given for the purpose of influencing the attorney's
actions as a public official. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 8101(A)(3) (1983).

67.

Significantly, the Committee found that whatever restraints applied to the lawyer-

legislator also applied to her law partners, although the committee noted that "the question is

not completely free from doubt." ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1182
(1971).
68. CAL. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST REPORT, supra note 36, at 17a, 17b, 18, 36, 40 (documenting instances of legislators' intimidation of agency personnel and concluding that legislators' representation of private clients before state agencies creates a conflict of interest); Stern,
supra note 7, at 253-54; Note, Conflicts of Interest ofState Legislators, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1209,
1220-21, 1227-30 (1963); Note, Legislators as PrivateAttorneys: The Need For Legislative Reform, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1052, 1053 (1983) (authored by Robert Reeves); Note, CurbingInflu-

ence Peddling in Albany: The 1987 Ethics in Government Act, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1051,
1057-58 (1988) (authored by Patrick J. Dellay).
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before state agencies could influence the legislator's approach to matters
that come before the legislature. Finally, the lawyer-legislator's paid representation of clients interferes with that legislator's ability to represent
all constituents before state agencies as part of his generally accepted
duties as legislator. 69 A legislator who is retained by a major utility, for
example cannot be expected to adequately represent the concerns of his
consumer constituents over high utility rates or the environmental
hazards of nuclear power plants in either his legislative activities or in his
communications to the state public service commission. If, in deference
to his private client, or in recognition of his conflict of interest, he refrains from voting on such issues, or from communicating with the commission, he has deprived his constituents of representation on matters of
public concern.
Taking a firm stand where its economic impact on the profession is
least significant, the ABA Committee unequivocally has held that a lawyer-legislator who voted for passage of legislation should not accept employment to contest the constitutionality of that legislation. Ironically,
while such representation would be inconsistent, to some extent, with the
attorney's public vote, it would create significantly less distrust of the
motives of legislators than the representation the Committee refused to
condemn.
The ABA's position provides little guidance to lawyer-legislators
and, if anything, conveys an attitude of permissiveness rather than prohibition. Unfortunately, this position on the issue continued with the
adoption of the new Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which has no
express counterpart to DR 8-101(A)(1) and speaks of the relationship
70
between lawyers and public officials in vague terms.
Without strong leadership from the ABA, state bar associations
have reacted to the lawyer-legislator conflict inconsistently. Some have
71
relied on the ABA opinions to condone lobbying by a legislator's firm,
69. CAL. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST REPORT, supra note 36, at 26.
70. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 8.4(e) (1983) ("It is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to: ... (e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official ..
"); see also id. Rule 1.11 ("Successive Government and Private
Employment," dealing primarily with government attorneys moving into private practice).
71. In Arizona, the state bar association, relying on ABA Formal Opinions 296 and 306,
held that since Arizona did not have a constitutional provision like that of Texas, lawyerlegislators' firms should not lobby before the legislature. Ariz. Ethics Comm., Ops. 124
(1963), 170 (1965). The association, however, suggested a legislative rule that would provide
such consent, id. Op. 170 (1965), and the rule was adopted. The bar association then allowed
such representation. Id. Op. 71-7 (1971). Ultimately, however, the Committee concluded that
disqualification of a lawyer-legislator's law firm from lobbying was an issue to be decided by
the Bar, not the legislature. The Committee nonetheless permitted the lobbying, so long as the
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while others have declined to follow the ABA and have prohibited the
practice.7 2 Decisions also are mixed with regard to practice before state
agencies. Some bar committees have banned it expressly,7 3 while others
lawyer-legislator forgoes any fees from the representation, abstains from voting, and the client
is advised of the restrictions on the firms. Id. Op. 73-3 (1973). The Arizona state bar relied on
a New Mexico opinion that held that a legislator's firm may lobby if the legislator does not
participate in the matter, the client is advised of the restriction, and the legislator receives no
portion of the fee. See N.M. Bd. of Bar Comm'rs, Op. 14 (1960), reprintedin I S.B.N.M.J. 12

(1961).
The Oregon State Bar went through similar contortions. In 1939, the Bar's Committee on
Legal Ethics clearly found a conflict of interest for an attorney, once elected to the legislature,
to pursue a client's interest by obtaining passage of a private bill. Or. Comm. on Legal Ethics,
Op. 10 (1939). In 1966, however, the Committee, relying upon a typographical error in the
first printing of the ABA's Formal Opinion 306, was willing to hold that a mere lobbying
registration statute constituted "consent" by the public to the conflict. Because that error was
quickly detected, the Oregon Bar's Board of Governors declined to adopt the opinion. Id. Op.
151 (1966), reprintedin 26 OR. S.B.B. 6 (1966). In March 1976, the Committee, relying upon
ABA Formal Opinions 192, 296 and 306, and the new Canons of Professional Responsibility,
held that lobbying by a lawyer-legislator's firm was a conflict of interest not excused by a
statute that required a legislator to declare a potential conflict of interest prior to voting. The
Committee believed that such a provision, which did not require disqualification, would hardly
create "a necessary implication... that the public consent is given" to having a legislator or
his firm consciously assume lobbying duties. Or. Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 318 (1976).
Two years later, however, the Board of Governors effectively overruled that opinion by holding simply, and without discussion, that "there is no Ethical violation where there is compliance with [the statute]." Id. Op. 409 (1978).
Also relying on ABA Formal Opinion 306, the Delaware Bar Association's Committee on
Professional Responsibility, while recognizing Michigan's strict position, opted to allow lobbying by a legislator, so long as the legislator does not vote on the question. Del. Comm. on
Professional Responsibility, Op. 1982-5 (1982).
72. In Florida, the bar association followed ABA Formal Opinion 296 in 1960. Fla.
Ethics Comm., Op. 59-31 (1960). In subsequent opinions, it declined to follow the ABA's
liberalization in Formal Opinion 306, totally unpersuaded by its logic. Absent an express provision allowing lobbying by a legislator, lobbying by a legislator's firm was held to be improper,
even if the legislator abstained or disclosed the reason for his abstention and did not share in
any way in the fees earned. Id. Op. 67-5 (1967). See also id. Ops. 73-19 (1973), 76-5 (1977).
For other ethics opinions prohibiting lawyer-legislators and their firms from lobbying see, e.g.,
Me. Professional Ethics Comm., Op. 28 (1982); Miss. Ethics Comm., Op. 62 (1981) (lieutenant
governor and his law firm prohibited from appearing before legislature and committees); N.H.
Ethics Comm., Op. 5 (1981) (city legislator); N.Y. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 415
(1975) (legislator's firm should not appear before legislative committees, except when specifically and expressly authorized by statute); Vt. Professional Responsibility Comm., Op. 83-5
(1983) (improper for lawyer to challenge law for which she voted); Va. Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 419 (1983) (improper for attorney to lobby legislature when his partner is a member of
the legislature); id. Op. 537 (1984) (reaffirming the opinion rendered in No. 419, despite the
passage of a comprehensive conflict of interest law); W.Va. Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 83-11
(1984) (legislators and their firms prohibited from appearing before Court of Claims which is
an arm of the Legislature).
73. See, eg., Ill. Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Op. 175 (1959) (legislator may
not appear when agency exercises discretion and when client's interest are adverse to those of
the state); Mo. Ethics Comm., Op. 195 (1981) (legislator and members of firm prohibited from
appearing before state agencies); La. Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Op. 127 (1975)
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allow the practice but admonish legislators not to use their position to
"unduly influence" state agencies. 74
Beyond these obvious examples of conflict, few bar associations have
directly addressed the inherent conflicts faced by lawyer-legislators
raised in the 1944 Michigan opinion. Those that have, follow the position of the ABA, reasoning that because conflict is inevitable, legislators
should abstain from voting only when legislation will have an effect that
is direct and peculiar to the client, and is not shared by the general public. 75 As a result, there are few ethical constraints on lawyer-legislators'
use of their public position to obtain benefits for their private clients.
(construing Canon 6 of the former Canons of Prof. Ethics, and holding that a lawyer-legislator
who exercises indirect control over agencies, through appointment and budgetary review, may
not appear before such agencies); N.J. Ethics Comm., Op. 250, reprinted in 96 N.J. L.J. 234
(1973) (when lawyer-legislator is a member of a professional corporation, no employees or
shareholders of firm may appear before state agencies); N.Y. Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Op. 415 (1975) (a legislator's firm may not appear before state agencies unless specifically and
expressly authorized by statute); Wis. Standing Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. E-76-2,
reprinted in Wis. B. BULL. 55 (Supp. 1984) (legislator may not appear before any state agencies) (overruling Wis. Standing Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. E-1973, reprinted in Wis.
B. BULL. (Supp. 1974)).
74. Del. Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Op. 1982-5 (1985) (no absolute ban, but
when legislator "has worked closely" with an agency or official, she must be "especially careful
to avoid profiting personally from this relationship"); Mass. Ethics Comm., Op. 82-6 (1982)
(legislator and member of firm may appear if they comply with MASS. GEN. L. ch. 268 A, § 4
(1989), which places limitations on appearance, and if they are careful to avoid attempt to
influence agency by virtue of their position); Vt. Professional Responsibility Comm., Op. 76-12
(1976), reprintedin 2 VT. B. J. 19 (1977) (no per se ban, but legislator must be careful not to
use position to influence tribunal; however, firm would be disqualified whenever legislator
would be disqualified).
75. The Delaware Bar Association, following the ABA's Informal Opinion 1182, concluded that because most legislation would affect a lawyer-legislator's clients, no absolute ban
on supporting legislation favorable to a client would be practical. "A lawyer should not be
restricted in the support of a bill of general interest to the public, even if the bill also happens
to affect the interests of a client." Del. Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Op. 1982-5
(1982). Rather, the legislator is only prohibited from obtaining a "direct and peculiar" advantage for a client. The committee did not provide any further guidance. A similar conclusion
was reached by the Maine Bar, Me. Professional Ethics Comm., Op. 28 (1982) (legislator and
firm may retain clients who are likely to be affected by legislation, unless compensation is
offered for purpose of influencing the legislator's official conduct); and the Maryland Bar, Md.
Professional Ethics Comm., Informal Op. 78-33 (1978) (lawyer-legislator disqualified from
voting on matter only when "his or her clients are directly affected personally or pecuniarily").
The Florida Bar, for a time at least, took a stricter view. In 1973, the ethics committee
held that a lawyer-legislator who had previously represented public bodies created by special
acts of the legislature could no longer represent them, since to do so would create a conflict
between his duties to the public and his duties to his clients. Fla. Ethics Comm., Op. 73-19
(1973). In 1976, however, the ethics committee softened its position and allowed a lawyerlegislator's partner to represent a municipality, so long as the legislator abstained from voting
on matters affecting the municipality and disclosed the relationship to all concerned. Id. Op.
76-5 (1976). The committee relied in part on a Florida Commission on Ethics opinion inter-
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The Response of the State Legislatures

Although state legislatures have addressed some conflict of interest
problems, the measures are not enough. Provisions to prohibit conflicts
are either construed too broadly to be effective or are generally not enforced. The states rely primarily on legislative disclosure, but this reliance is misplaced.
Some state legislatures have enacted a variety of provisions to deal
with the more obvious conflicts faced by lawyer-legislators. Several

states, going beyond the ABA's tentative position, have expressly banned
legislators and, in some cases, their law firms from representing clients
before some or all administrative agencies. 76 These limitations, however,
preting the State's Code of Ethics, and on ABA Informal Opinion 1182. Agreeing with that
opinion, the committee concluded that the Code of Professional Responsibility does not create
a blanket ban on dual employment by lawyer-legislators. The committee expressly distinguished and reaffirmed, however, its position disapproving lobbying by a legislator's law firm.
Similarly, the Nebraska State Bar Association, relying upon ABA Formal Opinions 296,
306, and Informal Opinion 1182, held that lawyer-legislators may engage in the practice of law
so long as they do not use their official position for special advantage of their clients. The Bar's
Advisory Committee emphasized that Nebraska had the lowest number of attorneys of any
state legislature and that "any unrealistic or inappropriate extension of restrictions or disabilities further depleting representation in legislative areas of government would be inconsistent
with the public interest." Neb. Bar Advisory Comm., Op. 75-12 (1975). Actually, Delaware
has the least number of attorneys in its legislature: none. See M. JEWELL, supra note 4.
76. See, e.g., FLA. CONsT. art II, § 8(e) (West 1989) (legislator prohibited from appearing
before any state agency); ALA. CODE § 36-25-10 (1977) (legislator or her law firm must disclose representation before agency to state ethics commission; complete ban on appearance for
a fee by legislator (but not her firm) before public service commission or state board of adjustment) (see Ala. Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 935 (1985)); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8920(3) (West
Supp. 1989) (legislator disqualified from appearing before most state agencies for a fee; law
firm not disqualified if legislator receives no compensation from representation); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 1-84(d) (West 1988) (legislator and law firm disqualified from appearing before
most state agencies for a fee) (see Conn. State Ethics Comm. Advisory Op. 80-19 (1980)); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-1461(h) (1987) (legislators may not appear before any district agency); HAW.
REv. STAT. § 84-14(c) (1985) (legislator disqualified from appearing before state agency for a
contingent fee only. The Hawaii State Ethics Commission, while acknowledging the statute's
express ban on only contingent fee representation before state agencies, consistently has opined
that any representation for a fee could amount to a legislator's use of position for undue influence and urged legislators to voluntarily refrain from such representation. See Haw. Ethics
Comm'n, Ops. 26, 27, 28 (1969), 70 (1970), 173, 174 (1973), 485, 505 (1983)); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 127, para. 602-104 (1981) (legislator barred from appearances before Court of Claims or
Industrial Commission, but members of firm not barred unless association with the legislator is
used to "influence or attempt to influence" the agency); id. para. 602-105 (legislator may not
appear before state agency when there is reason to believe that case has been offered with intent
to obtain improper influence over state agency); id. para. 602-106 (legislator shall not use
improper means to influence state agency); id. para. 602-205 (legislator, when feasible, should
arrange for other persons to make appearances before state agencies); IOWA CODE ANN. § 68
B.6 (West 1973) (legislator may not appear for compensation by himself or through another
before any agency or court "against the interest of the state"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 46-240
(1986) (representation by contingent fee prohibited); id. § 46-239 (disclosure of all cases re-

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41

are often ineffective. In some states, the most significant agencies are
exempt from application of the rule. In Illinois, for example, only appearances before the Court of Claims and the Industrial Commission are
banned. 77 In Texas, a legislator may appear before a state agency in any
78
proceeding that is adversarial, a matter of public record, or ministerial.
Similar rules apply in Wisconsin. 79 Moreover, the ban generally does not
apply to the legislator's law firm. In only two states, Connecticut and
New Jersey,8 0 does the ban extend to the legislator's law firm, while New
York and California allow other attorneys in the firm to appear so long
as the legislator receives no compensation from the client.8 Thus, in
most states the legislator may still peddle his influence to private clients
quired); id. § 46-242 (representation offered with intent to obtain "improper influence" and
where case is obviously without merit, prohibited; legislator shall not use threat or promise of
official action in an attempt to influence an agency); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.795 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1983) (legislator may not appear before agency for contingent fee; nor may
legislator use public position in improper attempt to influence agency); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 1, § 1014(2)(A) (1989) (legislator may not refer to status as legislator or use threats implicating legislative action when appearing before agencies); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A,
§ 4 (West 1989) (legislator may not personally appear before state agencies; disqualification
does not apply to quasi-judicial proceedings); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281.491(2) (Michie
1986) (legislator may appear before state agencies if "less than half of his time" is public
service and only before agency he does not serve); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:13D-16(b), (c) (West
Supp. 1989) (legislators and their firms prohibited from appearing for a fee before most state
agencies), (see N.J. Leg. Code of Ethics 2:2 (c) (same)); N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 73(2), (7), (10)
(McKinney 1988) (legislator may not appear, for compensation, before agencies on most matters; contingent fee prohibited for all appearances; law firm of legislator not barred if legislator
does not share in fee); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 102.04(A) (Anderson 1984) (legislator may
not receive compensation for any service rendered in a matter before any agency); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 4246(h) (West 1987) (legislator may not receive compensation for representing private entity before any state agency); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-470 (Law. Co-op.
1986) (legislators and firms barred from appearing before three enumerated agencies on rate or
price-fixing matters); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9b, § 7(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1989)
(legislator may not appear before agencies unless the proceeding is adversarial, a matter of
public record, or ministerial); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 19.45(7) (West 1986) (legislator may not
appear before agencies for a fee, except (1) in a contested matter against another private party;
(2) in an open hearing with stenographic record; (3) in a ministerial matter; or (4) in a tax
matter. In contested cases, legislator may not phone, visit or write to agency and may only
appear at the open hearing); WASH. CODE OF LEG. ETHICS Rule l(a)(6), (b)(1), (2) (1987)
(appearances before agencies by contingent fee prohibited; legislator shall not appear for a fee
in matters involving claims of state employees; legislator shall not use "improper means" to
influence a state agency).
77. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, para. 602-104 (1981).
78. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-96, § 57 (Vernon 1989).
79. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 19.45(7) (West 1986).
80. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-84(d) (West 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:13D-16(b),
(c) (West Supp. 1989).
81. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8920(3) (West Supp. 1989); N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 73(2), (7),
(10) (McKinney 1988).
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and indirectly intimidate the state agency. 82 In most states, uncompensated legislators can still appear. As one critic noted, however, the legislator may still exert undue influence 83 and indirectly be compensated by
higher fees for other services.8 4 Other states have required only disclosure of paid representation to appear before state agencies.85
A number of states have also banned legislators and their firms from
legislative lobbying. 86 Some have also banned former legislators from
82. [A]n administrative official who knows that an attorney appearing before the
agency is a partner or associate of a powerful legislator may feel the weight of [the]
legislator behind the attorney's cause no matter how carefully the legislator disassociates himself or herself from the matter. Of course, the problem is most acute when
the legislator's name appears on the firm's letterhead or pleadings, or when the legislator's name is invoked by the attorney.
CAL. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST REPORT, supra note 36, at 29. See also N.Y. COMM. ON
GOV'T INTEGRITY, ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 32
(Comm. Print 1988) [hereinafter NEW YORK ETHICS REPORT] (Comm'r Emery, dissenting)
("The impropriety, or appearance of impropriety, which occurs when a public official or employee appears before a state or local agency on behalf of a private client is no less when the
partner of the public official or employee does so.").
83. NEW YORK ETHICS REPORT, supra note 82, at 17.
84. See Note, Legislators as Private Attorneys: The Need for Legislative Reform, supra
note 68, at 1061-71 (criticizing California's statute on appearance before agencies as containing
too many loopholes, such as allowing appearances without compensation).
85. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 24.60.100 (1988) (very limited disclosure requirement; disclosure required for appearance before a state agency, board or commission); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 2-2.1-3-2(10) (Burns 1988) (appearances for a fee subject to mandatory but minimal disclosure requirement); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:1111 (E)(2) (West 1989) (assistance of an elected
official in dealings with a governmental entity, official, or agency must be disclosed); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 40A, § 3-102(f)(1) (1986) (very limited disclosure requirement; does not apply in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.08 (West 1988) (disclosure required for appearance before agencies with rulemaking power); 46 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 143.5 (d), (e)(7) (Purdon 1969) (appearances for a fee must be disclosed, except that appearances by a lawyer-legislator before an agency whose actions are subject to judicial review or
whose action is routine, need not disclose); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-639.41 (1987) (appearances
for a fee in excess of $1,000 by legislator or firm must be disclosed).
86. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8(e) (West Supp. 1989) (legislator may not lobby
before the legislature); ALASKA STAT. § 39.50.090 (1988) (public official may not accept
money for legislative advice or assistance); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8920(b)(4) (West 1989) (member of legislature shall not receive any compensation for any service relating to legislative
process); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-102, 2-16 (West 1988) (state employee may not lobby
the General Assembly) (see Conn. State Ethics Comm. Advisory Op. 80-19 (1988) (former
state employee and his law firm banned from lobbying)); HAW. REV. STAT. § 84-14(d) (1985)
(legislator may not represent client for a fee to secure passage of a bill); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
127, para. 602-101 (Smith-Hurd 1981) (legislator may not engage in lobbying); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 46-232 (1986) (legislator may not lobby for compensation); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 6.785 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985) (legislator may not lobby for compensation; if those having "close economic association" with legislator lobby, full disclosure must be made); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1014(l)(D) (1989) (legislator may not lobby for compensation); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 40A, § 3-102(b)(3) (1986) (legislator accepting payment from persons affected
by legislator's vote is disqualified from voting or attempting to influence legislation); MISS.
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lobbying. 87 New York has used the expedient of allowing the legislator's
firm to lobby the legislature, so long as the legislator does not share in the
fee from such lobbying.8 8 This economic Chinese wall is totally ineffective, however, in screening the legislator because economic benefit to the
89
firm can be transferred to the legislator in a number of indirect ways.
Recognizing that both the organized bar and the state's disciplinary committees might look askance upon such a device, the New York legislature
immunized its members' firms from any professional discipline for engaging in such lobbying. 90
Outside of these efforts to curtail lawyer-legislators' appearances
before state agencies and lobbying by them and their firms, few states
have tackled the inherent conflict between the goals of lawyer-legislators'
private clients and the public interest. Most states have dealt with conflicts of interest generally by: urging legislators not to accept outside employment or an economic opportunity that is designed to influence that
legislator's vote; 9 1 requiring legislators either to abstain from voting
CODE ANN. § 25-4-105(d) (1988) (public official may not receive fee for attempting to influ-

ence a decision of the entity of which the official is a member); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 102.04(A) (Anderson 1984) (public official may not receive compensation in a matter before
legislature or agency); 46 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 143.5(a) (Purdon 1969) (legislator shall not
receive anything of value for advocating passage or defeat of legislature); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 36-14-5(e)(2)(f) (Supp. 1988) (public official may not represent any party, of which the official is a member or an employee, before a legislative agency; "business associate" may represent such a party only if disclosure is made and official abstains from participation); TEX. REV.
CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9b, § 8(c) (Vernon 1989) (section that urges legislators not to accept employment that could reasonably impair independence of judgment construed to prohibit legislator's lobbying before the body of which he is a member. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No.
H-688 (1975), cited in Tex. State Ethics Advisory Comm'n, Op. 1984-1 (1984)); Fla. H.R. Op.
27 (1974) (legislator may not associate in a law firm with a lobbyist).
87. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8(e) (West 1989) (two year ban); ALA. CODE §§ 3625-13, 36-25-23 (1977) (three-year ban); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 5(e) (West
Supp. 1989) (one year ban on lobbying by legislator or partners; however, partners may lobby
if they form a separate firm in which legislator has no financial interest); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW
§ 73(8) (McKinney 1988) (two year ban on lobbying by former legislator); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 36-14-5(4) (1988) (general one year ban on legislator).
88. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73(1 1)(c) (McKinney 1988).
89. -[N]o sanctity is given to the arrangement if the legislator does not participate in the
fees received for the lobbying services. Such arrangements are simply too subject to abuse by
virtue of the flexibility inherent in other financial dealings between partners." Fla. Ethics Op.
67-5 (1967).
90. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73(11)(c) (McKinney 1988).
91. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8920(a), (b)(1) (West Supp. 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 1-84(b) (West 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.313(7) (West 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
127, para. 603-201, 301, 302 (Smith-Hurd 1981); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.780(1) (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1,§ 1014(I)(E) (1989); MD. ANN. CODE art.
40A, § 3-103(a)(1)(ii) (Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 23(b)(1) (West
Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52: 13D-14 (1986); N.Y. PUn. OFF. LAW § 74(3)(a) (McKinney 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120.86(a) (1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 4246(g) (West
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when they stand to gain direct economic advantage, or to disclose their
conflict; 92 or prohibiting public officers generally from using their posi1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-5(b) (1988); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9b, § 8(c)
(Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-16-4(4) (1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1639.33(5),
(6) (1987); N.J. LEG. CODE OF ETHICS § 2:1 (1983); UTAH JOINT LEG. RULES 16.03(1).
92. See, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art. IV, § 24 (West 1981) (legislator who has "personal or
private interest" in measure shall so disclose and abstain); TEX. CONST. art. III, § 22 (legislator who has "personal or private interest" in measure shall so disclose and abstain); ALASKA
STAT. § 24.60.110 (1988) (legislator must at least disclose conflict in the legislative journal);
CAL, GOV'T CODE § 87100 (West 1987) (public official shall not participate in making a governmental decision where he has a financial interest); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-86 (West
1988) (legislator who has conflict shall be excused from voting or shall prepare a statement of
conflict and explanation as to why he may rule objectively despite the conflict); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-1461(g) (1987) (legislator shall prepare statement of personal interest and may request to be excused from the deliberations); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.3143(2)(a) (West Supp.
1989) (legislator shall disclose "special private gain or the special gain of any principal by
whom he is retained" before voting; legislator never prohibited from voting); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 127, para. 603-202 (Smith-Hurd 1981) (legislator should eliminate interest causing conflict;
if not feasible, should "consider" abstaining); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.760(1) (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1985) (legislator shall disqualify himself when he has a "personal or private
interest"; legislator may participate in debate, however); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:1120
(West Supp. 1989) (legislator shall recuse himself when there is personal substantial economic
interest, or may vote upon filing of statement explaining the conflict and why such conflict
would not affect his vote); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1014(A) (1989) (legislator must
abstain from voting and not act to influence vote when he, or those in "close economic association," including clients, have a "direct financial interest" in an enterprise affected by the vote);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 40A, §§ 3-101(a), 3-102(a), (b) (1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
268A, § 6 (West Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § -10A.07 (West 1988) (legislator shall disclose any benefit to himself, family or associated business, not generally shared by public; no
prohibition on voting, unless bill creates an actual, as opposed to potential conflict); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 2-2-112 (1987) (when legislator has conflict created by personal or financial
interest, should consider disclosing or eliminating conflict, or abstaining); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 49-14, 101(3) (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281.481(3) (Michie 1986) (legislator shall
disclose financial interest); id. § 281.501(1) (legislator may not vote, but may otherwise participate when private interest or "commitment in a private capacity to the interests of others"
materially affects a reasonable person's independence of judgment); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:13D-18 (West 1986) (legislator must disclose personal interest before voting, may vote if
legislator believes he can cast "fair and objective vote"), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-88 (1988)
(legislator shall be asked to be excused if legislator has actual economic interest that would
impair judgment); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 4246(a) (West 1987) (legislator shall not promote "special interest" legislation on his own behalf or on behalf of any other person or entity
which affects the legislator); OR. REV. STAT. § 244.120 (1986) (legislator shall disclose potential conflicts of interest prior to voting); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-6 (Supp. 1988) (legislator
must file written statement of potential conflict with either commission and legislature, and if
choosing to vote, explain why the legislator may do so objectively); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13460(b) (Law. Co-op. 1986) (legislator must deliver statement of direct personal financial interest in any measure to the presiding officer and may ask to be excused from acting thereon);
Utah Joint Leg. Rule 16.03 (7) (legislation shall disclose "personal or pecuniary interest" in
legislation, presumed to conflict where there is direct monetary gain or loss); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 2.1-639.38 (1987) (legislator who has personal interest, or who represents one who may obtain direct or indirect benefit shall abstain; legislator may participate in debate, however, if
interest is disclosed); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.46(1)(a) (West 1986) (public officials shall not take
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tion to gain special privileges or financial advantage for themselves or
93
those with whom they have a financial relationship.
Broadly construed, these provisions effectively would eliminate conflict problems. Legislators would be prohibited from voting on measures
resulting in significant benefit to their clients. They also would be
banned from representing, as an attorney, any client interested in legislation pending before the legislative body. But such a broad construction
generally has been rejected. Because of the possibility that virtually
every piece of legislation will "affect" a lawyer-legislator's client, the conflict of interest statutes have been narrowly construed to prohibit a legislator from voting only when his client's interest is directly and peculiarly
affected. 94 Such narrow construction has not placed any substantial limitations on lawyer-legislators.
any official action in which official, his family, or organization with which he is associated has
a substantial financial interest); Ind. House Code of Ethics (no legislator shall participate in
any vote that might directly result in substantial increase of nonlegislative income of legislator); N.D.H.R. & Senate rules 318 and 319 (if legislator has "personal and private interest" in
any measure, that must be disclosed and whole body must then determine whether to allow the
member to vote; "The general practice in the Chamber is to permit the member to vote on the
question." Letter from Jay E. Buringrud, Asst. Director, N.D. Leg. Council to author, (Oct.
21, 1987) (copy on file at The Hastings Law Journal)); N.J. LEG. CODE OF ETHICS § 2:9
(1983); Ohio H.R. § 4, Senate Code of Ethics (member who has personal interest may obtain
permission to abstain); WASH. CODE OF LEG. ETHICS Rule l(a)(l) (1987) (legislator who has
personal interest-i.e., direct monetary gain or loss-shall not vote or influence legislator in
committee).
93. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-8-304(a) (1984); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 8920(b)(5),
87100 (West 1987 & Supp. 1989); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1461(b) (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 112.313(6) (West 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 84-13 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.760775 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 23(b)(2) (West 1989);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-4-105(1) (1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.452(2) (Vernon Supp. 1989);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-14, 101 (3) (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281.481(2) (Michie 1986);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:13D-23(E)(3), (f) (West 1986); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 74(3)(d) (McKinney 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 4246(c) (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 244.040(1)
(1986); 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 403(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-145(d) (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-410(1) (Law. Co-op. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-164(3) (1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.45(2)(5), 19.46(l)(b) (West 1986); Utah Joint Leg. Rules
16.03(6).
94. See, e.g., Fla. H. Comm. on Ethics, Ops. 80-7 (1980), 77-129 (1977) (lawyer-legislators may vote on and handle in committee legislation benefiting their clients, so long as clients
are benefited as a class); Mass. Ethics Comm., Conflict Op. 81-81 (1981) (lawyer-legislator
may vote on general legislation even if it affects private client. Legislator must, however, disclose interest); Neb. Accountability and Disclosure Comm., Advisory Op. 79 (1985) (lawyerlegislator may propose statute to legalize activity which a client wishes to engage in; no actual
or potential conflict when only client stands to benefit); Pa. Ethics Comm., Order No. 27
(1981) (legislator may vote on bills appropriating funds to governmental agencies that he represents as solicitor, since legislator would not provide agencies with any "unusual benefits").
Cf Wash. H. Bd. of Leg., Ethics Advisory Op. 1986, No. 2 (1987) (lawyer-legislator may not
support legislation that would resolve on-going litigation in which the legislator represents one
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In Alabama, for example, an advisory ethics opinion broadly applied a provision prohibiting use of one's position for special advantage to
prohibit voting on a measure affecting clients such as utility companies. 95
The legislature then promptly amended the provision's definition of a
"business with which [a legislator] is associated" to exclude any business
that is a client. 96 Subsequently, the Alabama Ethics Commission approved of a lawyer-legislator supporting and voting for a-bill that would
affect directly and solely the lawyer-legislator's client, because, under the
amended law, the client was not a business with which the legislator was
97
associated.
In California, a similar provision has been construed to prohibit a
legislator from voting on any matter affecting clients of the legislator or
his firm if the client is the source of 200 dollars or more in fees, but only
if the client would obtain an identifiable, direct financial benefit not
shared by a group or business 98.
The Hawaii State Ethics Commission faced an inquiry from lawyerlegislators holding key legislative posts who asked whether they could
represent "substantial corporations" engaged in real estate development
that clearly would be affected by state legislation. The Commission recognized the potential for conflict of interest, but chose only to suggest
that any action these legislators take on bills of importance to their clients "may constitute" a use of official position to obtain "unwarranted
treatment for themselves or others." 99 In situations when the legislation
was of "special interest" to clients, the Commission recommended
recusal by the legislator and disclosure of the interest.1°°
A significant flaw of such general conflict of interest provisions is
that they leave the recusal decision to the legislator. The legislator has
discretion to decide the matters on which he cannot exercise his judgment impartially. The problem with this approach is that it is self-policing and depends upon the judgment calls and ethical constraints of each
of the parties; such legislation, although affecting garnishment procedures generally, would

result in "direct monetary gain" to the legislator). See also supra note 16, for conflict of interest laws that exempt from conflict of interest regulation those private interests which are
shared by a group, class, or profession.
95. See Ala. Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 127 (1975) (construing ALA. CODE § 36-25-5
(1975)).
96. 1975 Ala. Acts 130 § 1 (codified as ALA. CODE § 36-25-5 (1975)).
97. Ala. Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 372 (1979).
98. Letter to Hon. Larry Stirling from Cal. Fair Political Practices Comm. (April 9,
1987) (construing CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 87100, 87103 (West 1987); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 2
§§ 18702.1, 18702.2, 18703(a) (1988)) (copy on file at The HastingsLaw Journal).
99. Haw. Ethics Comm., Ops. 26, 27, 28 (1969).
100. Id. Ops. 97, 105 (1971), 130 (1972), 170 (1973).
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legislator. 101 With no firm rules, the legislator may be tempted to rationalize her conduct based on the frequency of such conflicted representation. Moreover, such a self-policing rule makes saying no to client
influence difficult for even conscientious legislators because no bright line
defense to the client's importunings exists. Such rules state the obvious
and do little to provide guidance or to set community standards in a
10 2
particular legislative body.
Recusal also deprives a representative's constituents of representation in the legislature. When a judge recuses himself, the litigants are
provided with a new judge, presumably of equal qualification. When an
attorney withdraws from representing a client, the client generally can
obtain new counsel, even though he might prefer his original counsel.
But when a representative withdraws there is no one in the legislature to
fill the empty seat. The constituents are deprived of both an advocate to
press their case, and a judge to use her considered judgment to determine
what is in the constituents' best interests. 103
Finally, recusal may not avoid the conflict. A legislator may remove
himself from the debate, but may exercise considerable influence behind
the scenes. The fact that fellow legislators know that a particular legislator supports or opposes legislation is often more important than the legislator's vote. Moreover, the failure to vote itself may be significant; by not
voting that legislator may deprive the house of the necessary votes to
04
pass the measure. 1
Most states have been satisfied with the indirect remedy of extensive
disclosure. 10 5 Rules generally require legislators to reveal their assets
101. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York reported in 1970 that United
States House of Representatives Rule VIII, and § 376 of JEFFERSON'S MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE, which required members of Congress to disqualify themselves when
they had an economic interest in the outcome of legislation, were dead letters that had almost
never been used. CITY BAR REPORT, supra note 15, at 71-72.
102. One of the arguments in favor of a Code of Ethics for Congress, made in the 1950s by
Representative Charles Bennett of Florida, was that the Code would provide protection to
members of Congress who were importuned to exert influence on behalf of private interests.
R. GETZ, CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS 26-30 (1966).
103. "If the lawyer-legislator refrained from voting, he would thereby deprive the people
of his legislative district from their right to be represented upon such legislation by the action
of their own legislator." Mich. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 83 (1944); -[I]t seems that
intentional disqualification of a legislator under most circumstances is a positive disservice to
his constituents. Fla. Ethics Op. 67-5 (1967). See also CITY BAR REPORT, supra note 15, at
39.
104. Bigelow, Ethics in Government: A Look at the Issues, in ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT:
SELECTED STATUTES AND REPORTS 1-7 (P. Bigelow ed. 1973).
105. ALA. CODE § 36-25-14 (Supp. 1988); ALASKA STAT. §§ 39.50.050, 120 (1987); ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 21-8-304, -308 (1987); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 87200-87210 (West 1987); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 24-6-201, 202 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-83 (West 1988); D.C.
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and sources of income in considerable detail. These requirements, like
the provisions allowing a legislator to disclose a specific conflict and then
to vote, are based on the notion that, in a democracy, the people should
decide whether the actions of the legislator are appropriate. The people
will pass judgment on election day. 10 6 There are three problems, however, with this approach.
First, many of the disclosure laws have limited utility. They only
require legislators to reveal, in general terms, their source of income and
their property holdings. They generally do not require disclosure of information regarding the identity of the attorney's clients. 10 7 While disclosure of client names may be considered to be too much of an invasion
CODE ANN. § 1-1462 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.3145(3) (West Supp. 1989); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 84-17 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 127, para. 604A-101, 102 (1981 & Supp. 1989);
IND. CODE ANN. § 2-2.1-3-2 (Burns 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-229, -247, -248 (1986);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.710, .740 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 1,§§ 1016, 1017 (1989); MD. ANN. CODE art. 40A, § 4-101 (1986); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 10A.09 (West 1988); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 49-1493, -149,6 (1988) (the names of clients of a
partnership or professional corporation expressly are excluded from disclosure); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 281.561, .571 (1986) (names of clients expressly excluded from disclosure);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44B-2 (West Supp. 1989) (names of clients who pay in excess of $10,000
per year or 5% of firms income must be disclosed; see N.J. Election L. Enforcement Comm.
rules 19.25-19.3); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73-a (McKinney 1988) (clients need not be disclosed; "principal subject areas" of practice must be disclosed); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 120-95,
-96 (1988) (names of clients specifically excluded); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 16.1-09-02, -03
(1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 102.02; (Anderson 1988) (names of attorneys' clients expressly excluded from disclosure); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 244.050, .060, .070 (1986) (when a client of a legislator has a "legislative interest", the legislator must reveal that client's name if the
fee paid was in excess of S1,000, unless disclosure of the client's name is prohibited by a professional code of ethics); 65 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. §§-404, 405 (Purdon Supp. 1989) (disclosure
of source of income not required where such information is confidential pursuant to professional code of ethics § 405(b)(5)); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 36-14-16, -17, -18 (Supp. 1988); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 8-13-810, 820 (Law. Co-op. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-50-501, -502
(1988) (sources of income need not be specifically identified by name or amount); TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9b, §§ (3), (4) (Vernon Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.639.40,
.41 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 42.17.240, .241 (Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 19.43, .44 (West 1986) (individual payers need not be disclosed if official describes general
1
value of official's private business).
106. This sentiment was expressed forcefully by the Florida House of Representatives'
Committee on Ethics. Fla. Ethics Comm., Op. 12 (1969), reprintedin HOUSE JOURNAL, at
11-15. The Committee first noted that all legislators have economic and noneconomic interests
that influence their vote. Lawyers, especially, have numerous conflicts because they "represent
so many economic interests." The Committee then emphasized that disqualification of a legislator deprived the electorate of its representation, and a legislator had an affirmative duty to
vote "except on those occasions." The Committee concluded that disclosure of interests was
therefore the proper way to allow the electorate to judge the ethics of its representatives.
107. But see Haw. Disclosure Guideline No. 2, promulgated by the Hawaii State Ethics
Commission (cited in Haw. Ethics Comm'n, Ops. 173, 174 (1973)), which requires disclosure
of a lawyer-legislator's clients when the legislator knows or should have known of:
1. A client who is a party to regulatory action, transaction'or litigation in which the
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of privacy, disclosure of the type of client and the percentage of the lawyer-legislator's revenues derived from particular types of clients would be
reasonable and equally informative.
Second, and more fundamentally, disclosure does not provide an effective means of dealing with conflicts of interest. In theory, the disclosure of questionable practices would lead to public censure and eventual
removal from office. In the legislative branch, however, the process does
not work as contemplated. While substantial portions of the general
electorate may be offended by the practices engaged in by a particular
legislator, only the residents of that legislator's district have the ability to
take corrective political action. Those constituents, however, would
probably be interested more in the particular legislator's effectiveness in
getting benefits for their district than in the adverse effect that that repre0
sentative's actions may have on the public good of the state as a whole.' 8
In any event, the American electorate has become particularly reluctant to turn sitting legislators out of office.' 0 9 In the U.S. House of
Representatives, and especially in state legislatures, electoral defeat of
incumbents has become exceedingly rare."10 The natural propensity of
the electorate to give an incumbent the benefit of the doubt, and the treState is a party and for whom professional services on that particular matter are
rendered.
2. A client who has drafted or submitted directly or indirectly, bills, resolutions or
other matters to the Legislature, or a client who, directly or indirectly, communicates
with officials in the Legislature or executive branch with the purpose of influencing
legislative or executive actions.
3. A client who may be directly or indirectly financially affected by pending State
regulatory action or transaction if professional services on the particular matter are
rendered to the client.
108. Preyer, Legislative Ethics, in ETHICS AND GOVERNMENT 6-71 (Roscoe Pound Am. Trial Lawyers' Found. 1982); Note, Conflict ofInterest of State Legislators,supra note 68,
at 1213.
109. Incumbents usually do face rejection at the polls if they have been indicted, convicted, or officially censored by their colleagues. See Kirby, The Role of the Electorate in
Congressional Ethics, in REPRESENTATION AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 4, at 29-37.
110. Benjamin, The Power of Incumbency, in STATE GOVERNMENT 58-61 (T. Boyle ed.
1988). The author cites as an example New York, where, in 1986, 193 out of 194 state legislators who sought reelection were successful. The one loser was from a district specially targeted
by the Assembly Speaker as part of his effort to elect members who would support him in his
bid to be elected Speaker. The author explains that the power of incumbency is somewhat less
in the U.S. Senate because it is a national position, determined state-wide, which attracts highpowered opponents willing to spend the large sums of money needed to unseat an incumbent.
In 1988, almost 85 percent of incumbent state legislators nationwide who sought reelection
won. More than 95 percent of the members of the U.S. House of Representatives won. Jones,
The Role of Staff in State Legislatures, 61 J. ST. GOV'T 188, 189 (1988).
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mendous amount of campaign funds donated to incumbents give them a
formidable advantage over challengers."
Finally, political gerrymandering practiced by legislatures as part of
the periodic reapportionment process has created the equivalent of tenure in the political academy. Increasingly, incumbents are running without any opposition."12 Thus, disclosure of facts which may reveal a
conflict of interest pose little threat to the popular, well-financed incumbent. This is not to say that disclosure is useless, but only to caution that
the purported prophylactic effect is much diluted in the legislative
context.
III.

Some Suggested Solutions

The organized bar and state legislatures have shied away from dealing effectively with conflicts faced by lawyer-legislators because of fear of
deterring lawyers from public service and an unwillingness to place an
absolute ban on the outside practice of law. Yet, some very practical
solutions to the conflict exist. While these solutions would place some
limitations on lawyers' outside practice, they would also encourage lawyers to enter public service by creating clear and enforceable standards.
Certain conflicts can be remedied easily. Significant conflict and influence peddling can be eliminated by an express ban, through legislation
and organized bar enforcement, of appearances before state agencies by
legislators or their firms. A ban limited solely to the legislator does not
eliminate the potential for intimidation of the agency officials'" 3 or the
possibility of indirect remuneration to the legislator through enhancement of her firm's revenues. Moreover, "screening" of the legislator
from any involvement in such representation is ineffective since it is not
the legislator's knowledge that creates the undue influence, but her legis4
lative power to bring retribution upon the agency."
111. See, e.g., May, Bulging War Chests ProtectSeats in the House, N.Y. Times, March 6,
1989, at BI, col. 2 (members of Congress amass huge amounts of campaign contributions, even
though few face serious challenges from opponents).
112.

Lynn, Record Number of State Races Are Not Contests, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1988, at

B-I, col. 2; Kolbert, A HandfulofAlbany RacesAre "Hot,"N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1988, at B-10,
col. 1 (In the 1988 New York elections, 7 out of 38 members of Congress, 19 out of 60 Senators, and 41 out of 150 Assemblymen ran unopposed.).
113.

See supra note 82 and accompanying text.

114. The Association of the Bar of the City of N.Y. reached the same conclusion in recommending that the law firms of members of Congress be barred from appearing before federal
agencies, CITY BAR REPORT, supra note 15, at 115; see also J. MASKELL, ETHICS MANUAL
FOR MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 78 (1979) (overview of the standards of conduct, rules, regulations, and statutes as they relate to House of
Representative Members and employees).
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Second, a lawyer-legislator and his firm should be absolutely prohibited from lobbying the legislature. The firm, which has the same interests
as the legislator, cannot purport to represent the exclusive interests of a
private client while the legislator has sworn to act solely in the public
interest. The legislator cannot act independently when his firm is being
paid to represent the position of a private client. Even if the legislator
recused himself on the vote, his colleagues would know that his firm
stands behind the private client and may therefore vote the client's
wishes because of the legislator's influence. In sum, the legislator is being
paid indirectly to encourage his colleagues to vote for legislation
favorable to particular private interests. Even if the legislator does not
receive part of that particular fee, the legislator's general compensation
will reflect his worth to the firm in lobbying matters.
But the conflict of interest problem extends beyond these flagrant
situations to the ordinary case of a legislator representing private clients
who may or will be affected by the actions of the legislature. As the
ABA acknowledged in 1971, this problem potentially includes virtually
all clients.1 5 Private practice can create a conflict for the legislator
whether a client's interest in legislation is special and unique, or is shared
by a larger group, class, or profession as a whole. A legislator who represents a bank obviously can be subject to undue influence when voting on
legislation raising the usury rate, or adopting truth-in-lending provisions,
even though all banks in the state may be affected. 1" 6 While it seems
reasonable to allow a legislator to vote on measures from which he will
personally benefit only as part of a group or class, the group exception
makes little sense when it is the client who benefits.
There are several reasons why the "group" exception should not apply to clients. First, as noted above,' 1 7 the public is generally aware of
the legislator's group identity and can consider this when voting. The
legislator's client's group identity is almost never known by the public.
Second, the public can evaluate how a legislator has reconciled her group
interest with the public interest by examining her voting record in light
115. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1182 (1971); see supra notes 64-65
and accompanying text.
116. Consider the case of Virginia State Senator Peter K. Babalas, who was censured by
the Virginia Senate for having accepted $60,000 in legal fees from a second-mortgage lending
company allegedly paid in part for Babalas' role in killing legislation that would have imposed
interest rate ceilings on loans made by all such lending companies. Criminal prosecution of
Babalas ended in acquittal of one charge and dismissal of the second. Va. Senate Votes To
Censure BabalasFor Ethics Violation, supra note 36; Moore & Baker, Babalas to Be Prosecuted
Under Va. Conflict Law, Wash. Post, Jan. 8, 1986, at D-1, col. 5; Baker, Va. Ethics Panel
Hears Arguments For Sen. Babalas, Wash. Post, Dec. 24, 1985, at B-l, col. I.
117. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
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of her identifiable group. Evaluating how a legislator has reconciled her
client's interests with those of the public is much more difficult, since the
clients are often unknown. More importantly, a lawyer-legislator receives direct remuneration in the form of fees from the client whose legislative interests are protected. Even if the fees are not paid or earned
directly in return for legislative services, the indirect economic impact is
too significant to be ignored. While it is sometimes difficult for a legislator to subordinate his professional or group interest to that of the public
at large, it may be impossible for him to risk loss of an important client
for the greater public good. 1 8 This may be especially true when the legislator believes that the disenchantment of an important client-may redound to the detriment of an entire law firm, to which the legislator feels
considerable loyalty. Finally, in the eyes of the public, unabashedly promoting the interests of a particular group is often defensible; promoting
the interests of.those who are simply willing to pay a fee is rarely
acceptable.
The conflicts created by .the private practice of legislators are more
numerous than ethics committees or legislators are willing to admit. Requiring legislators to recuse themselves or to announce a conflict only
when a client's interest in legislation is "direct" and "unique" leaves
many real conflicts unresolved.
The organized bar should recognize that its integrity is adversely
affected by lawyer-legislators who use public office to advance private
interests. The ABA should amend DR 8-101 to admonish a lawyer not
to use his public position to obtain, or attempt to obtain, a special advantage in legislative matters for the lawyer or for a client. Such a ban
would apply whether or not the client's interests coincided with the
"public interest."' 19
The ban should be enforced by the rule adopted by the Michigan bar
in 1944: no lawyer-legislator should accept or continue employment by
any client "directly or indirectly" interested in legislative action.' 20 A
client should be considered "interested" in legislative action when (1) a
specific legislative measure will have a "direct and unique" impact on the
client; or (2) a measure will have a substantial impact on the client, even
though the measure impacts on a larger group or class, and the client has
evidenced its interest in legislative action by its own conduct, such as
formally or informally making its views known to the legislature or by
retaining a lobbyist to espouse its positions.
118.
119.

See comments of former ABA President Malone, supra text accompanying note 13.
See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.

120. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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The first standard is now generally accepted by the organized bar.' 2'
The second standard would deal with the concerns expressed above,
namely, that a lawyer-legislator may be using his public office to advance
a client's interests though the client's position is common to a group or
class. Because virtually all clients can be substantially affected by legislative action, however, some method must be devised to limit the scope of
any rule to those clients who are likely to seek to influence legislators.
Those clients are identified objectively by their own conduct.
Precedent for such an approach comes from the rules of the U.S.
Senate, which prohibit senators from accepting gifts in excess of 100 dollars from any person or entity "having a direct interest in legislation." A
person is deemed to have such a "direct interest" when that person is or
works for a registered lobbyist or maintains a political action committee. 122 Similarly, the State of Hawaii's disclosure rules require a lawyerlegislator to disclose those clients who have submitted proposed bills to
the legislature or who have communicated with the legislature for the
purpose of influencing legislative action.
If a legislator's long time client becomes interested in particular legislation, the legislator should not be required to sever that relationship.
Rather, the legislator should announce his interest in the legislation and
withdraw from any participation, formal or informal, in the legislation's
passage. If a client is consistently or perennially interested in legislation,
persistent recusal deprives a legislator's constituents of her services. In
this case, the legislator should sever the lawyer/client relationship.
While the ethical obligations of the lawyer-legislator would be interpreted on a case by case basis, the position proposed in this article would
end the atmosphere of permissiveness that exists today. It would create a
presumption against the acceptance of retainers by clients traditionally
interested in legislation, such as banks, utilities, unions, and insurance
companies. It would also encourage legislators to steer clear of committee assignments that would require them to draft and recommend legislation that may affect their clients, rather than encouraging them to seek
23
such committee assignments, as they have in the past.
Committee assignments also provide an opportunity for state legislatures to adopt preventative measures. While the power of legislative
committees varies from state to state, 124 much of the important work of
121.
122.
(1984).
123.
124.

See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
S. Doc. No. 100-1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., Rules XXXV (1)(a), (b)(1), (2), at 67-68
Haw. Disclosure Guideline No.2, 2 (reproducedsupra note 107).
See, e.g., CITY BAR REPORT, supra note 15, at 53 (U.S. Senator, as Chairman of the
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legislatures often takes place in the committees. 125 The committee has
the advantages of initiative and of shaping the debate on the floor. Once
a piece of legislation receives the approval of a key committee, floor de126
bate is often non-existent or perfunctory.
The importance of committees in the legislative process points to the
need for a legislative rule or statute bringing conflict of interest considerations into the committee assignment process. Legislatures should require that each member, upon election and annually thereafter, disclose
to a legislative ethics committee not only that legislator's personal economic interests, but also any substantial clients and the services to be
performed for those clients. The actual names of clients would be omitted from public disclosure in deference to the confidentiality of the attorney/client relationship. "Substantial clients" could be defined as those
Senate Commerce Committee fought against funds for the St. Lawrence Seaway while his firm
was retained by railroad companies); GOULDEN, supra note 33, at 268-69, 282-83 (U.S. Senator, as member of Senate Commerce Committee played "key role" in legislation helping railroads while his firm represented a railroad company; same Senator, as member of Senate
Finance Committee tried to kill tax regulation adverse to a company he had an interest in;
member of the U.S. House of Representatives received fees from Teamster attorney while his
subcommittee investigated matters relating to former Teamster president).
125. Generally, committees tend to be strongest in those states in which one party dominates the legislature. Where there is a strong two-party system, political leadership and the
party caucus may be equally, or more, important in shaping the legislative agenda. Francis,
Leadership, Party Caucuses and Committees in U.S. State Legislatures, 10 LEGIS. STUD. Q.
243, 243 (1985). In A. ROSENTHAL, LEGISLATIVE PERFORMANCE IN THE STATES (1974),
states are categorized on the basis of the strength of their committees' performance. "Better
performing" committees are described as those that "are referred bills, make choices, amend or
substitute, prevail on the floor during sessions, and continue working with some results during
the interim." While two populous states, California and Ohio, are included among the fourteen states with the "best performing" committee systems, seven populous states, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas, are among the 20
poorer-performing states. Id. at 42.
In New York, the newly elected majority leader of the Senate reportedly has pledged to
his fellow senators that he would curtail the power of the central staff, which works for the
leaders, and give more authority to the individual committees. New Leader in State SenateSoft-Spoken, Tough Negotiator, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 5, 1988, at 1, col. I.
126. "[T]he most important work of the state legislatures, like that of Congress is conducted by standing and special committees." E. USLANER & R. WEBER, PATTERNS OF DECISION-MAKING IN STATE LEGISLATURES 74-75 (1977) (quoting COMMITTEE ON AM.
LEGISLATURES, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASS'N, AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATURES 95
(1954)); A. ROSENTHAL, LEGISLATIVE LIFE: PEOPLE, PROCESS AND PERFORMANCE IN THE
STATES 181-204 (1981) (committees' influence varies significantly from state to state, but they
are "the basic work groups of the legislature." Id. at 181. Once bills pass committee, they are
usually adopted by the full body. Id. at 200-01); CITY BAR REPORT, supra note 15, at 69
(member of Congress has much greater opportunity to influence legislation in committee). See
also J. GOULDEN, supra note 33, at 281-83 (recounting past scandals in which Congressmen
used their influence on committees to favor private clients).
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who have provided more than 5,000 dollars in fees in any calendar year
in the past three years.
The ethics committee would then determine, based upon this disclosure, whether the legislator should be prohibited, because of likely conflicts of interest, from serving on particular legislative committees. The
legislative committee would exclude a legislator from serving on any
committee that had responsibility for legislation that (1) was likely to
affect uniquely and directly any of the legislator's major clients, or (2)
has been of interest to the client or similarly-situated clients in the past.
General interest legislation, such as revenue and general budgetary legislation, would not create a conflict with regard to any private clients.
If the legislator disagreed with the conclusions of the ethics committee, the legislator could request a public hearing on the matter. If the
legislator still disagreed with the determinations of the committee, the
legislator could appeal to either the senior most member of the legislative
body or a group of senior members. The leaders could overrule the committee determination only upon a written decision setting forth specific
reasons for the decision. This decision also should be available to the
public.
Reducing conflicts of interest through the screening of committee
assignments should not be limited to lawyers. The Association of the Bar
of the City of New York made a similar proposal in 1970 to reduce conflicts of interest in Congress. Specifically, the Bar recommended that
members of congress avoid committees whose jurisdiction would likely
create a conflict, and that the committees themselves should adopt conflict of interest rules that would prohibit members from having any
outside interests that could be specifically affected by committee action. 127 The Bar also recommended a requirement that members of congress disclose not only the nature of their personal assets, but also the
128
names of clients of the congressman's law firm.
Such a system still could be subject to abuse by the leadership and
could be eviscerated by a legislative body that simply did not wish to
cooperate. The fact that the entire proceeding and all decisions thereto
pertaining would be subject to public review, would provide some safeguard from abuse and allow the public to determine whether the leadership was serious about avoiding conflicts of interests. At the very least,
127. See, e.g., D. Songer, The Influence of Empirical Research: Committee v. Floor Decision Making, 13 LEGIs. STUD. Q. 375 (1988) (vast majority of South Carolina legislators deferred to subcommittee's expertise in tort reform legislation: only subcommittee members had
actively studied relevant empirical data, and other legislators relied upon their advice).
128. CITY BAR REPORT, supra note 15, at 66-71.
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such a mechanism would provide an avenue of escape for legislators who
might be importuned by significant clients. The legislator could rely on
the ethics committee's determination to explain to a client why the legislator was not in a position to influence legislation that could significantly
affect that client's interest.
Legislative leaders require special consideration. The legislative
leadership, generally composed of the President pro tern of the Senate,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives or Assembly, and the two
ranking party leaders of the minority, has inordinate power compared to
other members of the legislature. 129 This power generally derives from
control over other members' office budgets, committee assignments, campaign assistance, local aid to their districts, and office allocation. 130 In
the New York Senate, for example, the majority leader has all of these
powers as well as the absolute right to "star" a bill and thereby prevent
its consideration by the entire body. 13 1 Generally, legislative leaders also
32
are paid significantly greater salaries and expense stipends.1
Because of their inordinate power, they also are more susceptible to
influence. If they are attorneys, this influence often comes from the payment of retainers to them or the law firm's with which they are associated.13 3 Their positions cannot truly be considered part time, and they
should be subject to the same restrictions as full-time government officers
and members of Congress. In short, they should be prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law.

IV.

A Full Time Legislature?

One possible criticism of these proposals is that they will accelerate
the decline in the number of attorneys serving in state legislatures. It
undoubtedly is true that these proposals will make it more difficult for
attorneys to practice law while serving as state legislators. Insofar as
129. Id. at 75.
130. A. ROSENTHAL, supra note 126, at 165-74, 200-01. For example, in the New York
State legislature, the Speaker and the Senate majority leader wield enormous power:
Unlike in Congress, there is no conference committee made up of legislators to
work out differences between the two houses. Much of that is done here in what is
called a leaders' meeting in which three people - the Governor, the Assembly
Speaker and the Senate majority leader - meet behind closed doors, with no record
kept, to strike the deals whereby legislation rises or falls.
Lawmakers often telephone reporters to find out the results of those meetings, so
they will know how they will be voting.
Schmalz, Blurred Linesfor Lawmakers in Albany, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
131. A. ROSENTHAL, supra note 126, at 165-74; Kolbert, supra note 39.
132. See generally COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'Ts, supra note 47, at 104-07.
133. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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these proposals may discourage attorneys from using service in the state
legislature to attract client's willing to pay for their influence, such deterrence is beneficial. More significantly, the implementation of these proposals may simply facilitate what may be inevitable in many of the more
populous states: a full-time legislature.
As the issues facing state legislatures become more numerous and
complex, the legislatures become more institutionalized. 134 Larger staffs,
longer sessions, and more responsibility delegated to committees are required to increase institutional capacity. 1 35 The legislatures of several
states, California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin are now nearly full time, considering their
lengthy sessions, relatively high pay, and the number of legislators who
36
consider themselves full-time public officers.1
The increase in legislative duties makes outside employment significantly more difficult. 137 Such outside occupations traditionally were con38
sidered necessary, however, because of inadequate legislative pay.'

Low pay creates a sense of frustration that may cause legislators to leave
legislative service after two or three terms, either to run for a true full-

time position or to return to private life. 139 Legislators have increased
personal staff because they lack the time to attend to details themselves.

Ironically, this increase in staff tends to increase rather than decrease the
140

legislator's involvement.
The almost full-time legislature has also begun to attract a different
type of legislator: those increasingly from modest paying professions or
134.

M. JEWELL, supra note 4, at 184.
135. Id.; COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'Ts, supra note 47, at 76-83.
136.
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, supra note 47, at 78, 97-99. A 1986 survey found that
more than 60% of the legislators in New York and 65% of the legislators in Pennsylvania
define their occupation as "legislator.". B. BAZAR, supra note 9, at 2. Nationwide, I1% of all
legislators consider themselves full-time, but an additional 7% list themselves as "retired" and
another 3% as "homemakers." Id. One well-respected student of state legislatures estimates
that the actual percentage of full-time legislators nationwide is about 20%, up from 10% ten
years ago. Rosenthal, Origins of Staff Wars, 61 J. ST. GOV'T 198 (1988).
137. A 1986 survey found that the percentage of legislators in the larger states who are
"business owners" is smaller than in the less populous states with limited sessions. COUNCIL
OF STATE GOv'Ts,

supra note 47, at 78.

138. The Citizens Conference on State Legislatures reported in 1971 that
there is much evidence to suggest that low legislative salaries make it impossible for
all but a select group of people to serve in the legislature: lawyers, real-estate and
insurance agents, and others who because they must pursue a private and public
career at the same time, find themselves inevitably and incessantly involved in conflicts between the two.
J. BURNS, THE SOMETIME GOVERNMENTS 138 (1971).
139. M. JEWELL, supra note 4, at 186.
140. Id.
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those young or old enough to find the salary level tolerabje. 14 1 This trend
tends to confirm the fact that legislators, of necessity, are increasingly
viewing their positions as essentially full time. By recognizing this reality, and raising compensation to realistic levels, 142 the states could again
attract candidates from all economic strata.
As legislatures become more professional, that is, as salaries and
available staff increase, average tenure also increases.' 43 Studies show
that turnover within legislatures has been falling consistently throughout
this century 144 and turnover generally is lowest in those states where pay
is highest and choices for using the legislature as a stepping stone to
higher office are greatest.145 Political scientists generally favor this development because it increases expertise and continuity from session to
46
session.1
The political desirability of a full-time legislature is beyond the
scope of this article. As various states consider the possibilities of adopting a full time legislature, however, they should consider the substantial
gains in legislative independence that will result from such a shift. In
return for adequate salaries, legislators could be required to forego all
outside earned income, or income in excess of a small percentage of their
salary. 147 In this way, opportunities for conflicts of interest would be
Francis, Costs and Benefits of Legislative Service in the American States, 29 AM. J.
Q. W. R. at 1768-69 (1983)).
142. The Citizens Conference on State Legislatures recommended in 1971 that all state
legislators should be paid at least $10,000, and that those in the more populous states should
be paid $20,000 to $30,000. J. BURNS, supra note 137, at 160. In today's dollars, these salary
levels would be approximately $27,000, $54,000, and $81,000 respectively. See U.S. DEPT. OF
141.

POL. Sci. 626, 629 (1985) (citing CONG.

COMMERCE,

143.

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES

450 (1988).

Squire, Career Opportunities and Membership Stability in Legislatures, 13 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 65, 68-70 (1988).
144. Niemi & Winsky, Membership Turnover in U.S. State Legislatures, 12 LEGIS. STUD.
Q. 115, 122 (1987).
145. Squire, supra note 142, at 67, 69.
146. See Oxendale, Membership Stability on Standing Committees in Legislative Lower
Chambers, 54 J. ST. GOV'T 126 (1981):
State legislatures, and especially their lower chambers, have long had highly unstable
internal and external membership patterns. Since the early writings of Charles
Hyneman, membership instability in state legislatures has concerned academicians
and practitioners alike, and most observers have concluded that such turnover rates
adversely affect the institution. Rather than developing a reservoir of professional
legislators who become policy specialists and legislative professionals, legislatures
must constantly acclimate new members to procedures and policy specialties.
147. Currently members of the U.S. House of Representatives may receive up to 30% of
their salaries in outside income (House Rule XLVII), while Senators may receive up to 40% (2
U.S.C. § 31-1 (1988)). The President's Ethics Commission has recommended, however, that
outside earned income for all senior federal officials, members of Congress, and federal judges
be limited to approximately 15% of their salaries. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON FEDERAL ETHICS
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dramatically reduced. While the creation of such a full-time legislature
would not eliminate the possibility for undue influence and corruption, 148
it would reduce lawyer-legislators' temptation to supplement their income through the tacit selling of influence. A ban on outside practice
would be clear, unambiguous, and relatively easy to enforce.
A full-time legislature also would reduce the conflicts of interest
faced by staff. So long as the legislature is considered part time, staff are
free to be associated with private law firms, even though they may earn
substantial salaries in the legislature. This outside employment creates
the same conflict for the staff as that found by lawyer-legislators. With
the establishment of full-time positions, outside employment could be
14 9
eliminated completely.
It might be argued that a full-time legislature would consist only of
a professional class that is completely isolated from the community it
represents.150 This argument, however, ignores the fact that representatives' views are probably shaped much more by the occupations from
which they come, than from the part-time occupations they may pursue
while in the legislature. Surely a farmer, for example, does not lose his
empathy for farmers' problems when he assumes full-time duties as a
LAW REFORM, To SERVE WITH HONOR: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
FEDERAL ETHICS LAW REFORM (1989) [hereinafter FEDERAL ETHICS COMMISSION].
Recently, the Attorney General of Massachusetts recommended a cap of $40,000 on the
annual outside income earned by state legislators and senior executive branch officials. The
recommendation came after disclosure that the Senate President had received a $267,000 legal
fee in connection with a real estate development project in Boston. The developer has charged
that the fee was extorted from him by the President's law partner. Loth, Shannon ethics bill
seeks cap on legislators' income, Boston Globe, Mar. 1, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
148. Obviously, Congress, which has essentially eliminated the outside practice of law, see
supra notes 43-44, has not eliminated scandal or conflict of interest. Most recently, attention
has been focused on the "honoraria" representatives and senators may receive for speeches and
appearances before parties clearly interested in legislative action. Although limited to $2,000
per occasion (2 U.S.C. § 4411 (1988)), these payments have been strongly criticized in and out
of Congress. The Quadrennial Commission recommended that such honoraria be eliminated
in return for a substantial increase in Congressional pay. COMMISSION ON EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL SALARIES, FAIRNESS FOR OUR PUBLIC SERVANTS, 24-25 (1988). A
recommendation to ban honoraria for all federal officials has also been made by President
Bush's Ethics Commission. FEDERAL ETHICS COMMISSION, supra note 145, at 33-38.
149. The conflict of interest faced by senior legislative staff in the New York Senate has
been an issue of some controversy. Recently, the newly elected majority leader, Ralph Marino,
announced that his two senior counsel would be full-time employees and would not engage in
any outside private practice. The shift to full-time status was made, according to Senator
Marino, not only because of the problem of conflict of interest, but also because the legislature
was moving to full-year sessions leaving little time for outside practice. Spencer, Senate Majority Leader Names Counsels, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 8, 1988, at 1, col 3.
150. See, e.g., Bigelow, supra note 104, at 1-8.
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congressman. There is no reason to expect a different-result in the state
legislatures ,151
Conclusion
Democracy is stronger when the public believes that its elected representatives are acting in the public interest, unaffected by undue influence born of self interest or the interests of those who have a peculiar
claim on the representatives' loyalty. While many view the legislative
process as simply "every man for himself," where each group fights tirelessly for its own interests to the exclusion of others, this "pluralist"
model invites cynicism, disrespect for representatives, and, some believe,
unethical conduct.' 52 A fiduciary model, even if not fully attainable in
an imperfect world, is still a preferable goal.
Legislators who are also practicing attorneys often face a conflict
between their fiduciary duty to act in the public good and their fiduciary
duty to act in the best interest of their clients. Even when both the lawyer-legislator and the client enter into a relationship without the intent of
influencing the legislator's public position, the attorney's actions as a legislator inevitably are influenced by his private representation of the client. This problem, although endemic in the American system, has been
the subject of little discussion or remedial action. Although the complete
prohibition of outside practice may be impractical, the organized bar
should recognize expressly the significant potential for conflict of interest
and admonish lawyer-legislators to avoid representing clients who have
significant interests in legislative action. Moreover, preventive measures,
such as those recommended here, could deal with the most likely occasions for conflict of interest. These measures will disadvantage some attorneys. This should be welcomed by the vast majority of the public and
the bar which has long resented the selling of influence rather than
expertise.
151. In any event, proponents of the "citizen legislature" ignore the fact that the failure of
legislative salaries to keep up with the increased time commitments has made legislative service
impossible for many citizens. As a Kansas state legislator commented in 1970,
Wichita lost three of its best legislators in 1970 simply because they could no longer
stand the financial sacrifice involved. I submit that the system is predicated on the
assumption that membership in the body is open to everyone. Compensation should
be considerably raised to assure the validity of such an assumption.
J. BURNS, supra note 138, at 139.
152. "The dominant pluralist view of politics, whether as mere description or as a normative theory, may then be one of the major causes of unethical behavior by political actors,
including voters. By glorifying and therefore legitimating the motive of self-interest, it encourages self-interested behavior at all levels of government ..
" Fleishman, supra note 2, at 57.

